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Abstract
Comparing Hitler and Stalin: Certain Cultural Considerations
by Phillip W. Weiss

Adviser: Professor David M. Gordon

There is a great temptation to compare the Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin.
This is true for two reasons: first, the careers of both men converged at the same
point in history, thus doubling the impact both made and second, because the
names Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin have become metaphors for ideologies and
crimes that today are reviled. The question then arises: who was worse, Hitler or
Stalin? This project shows that there is no viable, credible, definitive, or final
answer to this question, and that prevailing attitudes about Hitler and Stalin have
become so ingrained in contemporary society as to render any meaningful or
useful comparison virtually impossible. Tragically, it might even be impossible to
render a final totally objective judgment of their actions. This is the most
disturbing element of this work.
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Weiss 1
Introduction
Historian Richard Overy has written, “The temptation to compare Hitler and
Stalin is a compelling one. They are popularly regarded as the twin demons of the
twentieth century, responsible for different reasons and in different ways for
more violent deaths than any other men in history” (Overy, 2004, xxxi). Overy is
correct on both counts. There is a great temptation to compare the two. This is
true for two reasons: first, the careers of both men converged at the same point
in history, thus doubling the impact both made and second, because the names
Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin have become metaphors for ideologies and crimes
that today are reviled. The question then arises: who was worse, Hitler or Stalin?
It is my thesis that there is no viable, credible, definitive, or final answer to
this question, and that prevailing attitudes about Hitler and Stalin have become
so ingrained in contemporary society as to render any meaningful or useful
comparison virtually impossible. Tragically, it might even be impossible to render
a final totally objective judgment of their actions. This is the most disturbing
element of this work.
It is argued that each dictator must be judged solely on his own record, and
that neither dictator nor the ideologies they represent can be defended or
attacked based on the record of the other. To support my thesis, this paper will
include analysis and discussion of the relationship between mass media and its
influence on shaping public opinion, discussion of the areas where the careers of
Hitler and Stalin converge and diverge, the cultural influences that shaped their
respective ideologies, and the findings of other historians who have attempted a
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comparative analysis. This is followed by a conclusion based on the evidence
presented.
______________________________________________________________________
Why do Americans believe, even decades after their deaths, that Hitler and
Stalin were twin demons, or, in the words of psychologist Marina Stal, “merciless
tyrants” (Stal, 2013, 8)? It is understandable why Hitler and Stalin would have
generated so much hostility when they were alive. There was overwhelming and
incontrovertible evidence that both were pursuing aggressive, expansionist,
ideologically driven programs that were brutalizing people and ultimately posing
a threat to the security of the United States. American opposition to Hitler was not
driven by prejudice against Germans nor were Americans unreasonably biased
against Stalin, whose domestic program and foreign policy, both pre- and postWorld War Two, e.g., the collectivization of agriculture, the great purge, the Nonaggression pact, the invasion of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, the
emergence of the Iron Curtain, the North Korean invasion of the south, Soviet
acquisition of nuclear weapons, the emergence of “Red” China, and the 1948
Berlin blockade, provided a long list of reasons for concern (Allport, 1954, 8).
That was decades ago. However, there is still deep hatred for Hitler and Stalin
today. In a 2011 BBC documentary about Stalin, the narrator, Professor David
Reynolds, calls him a “gangster” and “street thug” (SMS, video). Reynolds’
contempt for the Soviet dictator is obvious, but the intensity of his hatred seems
misplaced, for its target is dead and buried in Moscow. But for Reynolds, it was
as though he was still alive.
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Nevertheless, regardless of how detested they are, for a time both Hitler
and Stalin were respected, their careers celebrated, their respective personas
admired. Hitler was admired by much of the British establishment, including
Lloyd George. The US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph Davies, wrote a
book, Mission to Moscow, which extolled the virtues of the country under Stalin.
After World War Two the Supreme Allied Commander and future president of the
United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a gesture of mutual respect, joined Stalin
on the podium in Red Square to celebrate victory (GtS, video, n.d.). Rochus Misch,
Hitler’s bodyguard and valet, who lived with Hitler for five years, knew Hitler “only
as a wonderfully good boss” and said that “we couldn’t have wished for better”
and that “he was never authoritarian” (Lock, 9/6/13). The 1935 documentary
Triumph of the Will contains scenes showing hundreds of thousands of Germans
wildly cheering Hitler.
The reason why Hitler and Stalin, even decades after their deaths, still
provoke such strong negative feelings is because their names have been kept
alive by the mass media, which is responsible for shaping what the public knows,
believes and remembers. Social psychologist Edward Bernays wrote:
We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes
formed, our ideas suggested largely by men we have
never heard of. This is the logical result of the way our
democratic society is organized. (Bernays, 2005, 37)
Our thoughts and perceptions are based on information and knowledge that we
are taught. Professor Reynolds is part of that process. By devoting a full-length
documentary to Stalin, he was helping to keep the memory of both Hitler and
Stalin alive.
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Now, what is meant by the term “mass media”? The mass media are those
organizations through which information is disseminated to the public. They
include newspapers, books, magazines, radio, television, and the movies. Print
media has existed for centuries and for centuries was the dominant method for
the dissemination of information. However, print has been eclipsed by movies
and television, and today these instruments are dominant.
The appeal of movies is without rival. First, they are readily accessible in
theaters, homes, online and on DVDs, and second, can be enjoyed by anyone:
one does not have to be literate, educated or specially trained. Movies can be
watched in small groups or in large audiences. Because movies can be watched,
they are often a social event. Movies and its first cousin television are without a
doubt the most democratic and most efficient form of mass communication in
history. Their pervasiveness and place in contemporary culture is so well
established and so self-evident that it requires no further comment here. It is
extremely unlikely that by the age of three a person has not been repeatedly
exposed to movies or television.
Movies have a worldwide appeal. This is because they are packaged as art,
that is, something that is created specifically to influence the emotions. Movies
tantalize us. Reading a book forces the reader to use their imagination; watching
a movie allows the passive absorption of what is imagined (by others) seem real.
Some of the most honored artists in the world today are film producers, directors
and actors. Many, including some who have been dead for decades – Gable,
Chaplin, Monroe, Bogart, Hepburn, Brando, Dean, Presley, Harlow, Scorcese,
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Coppola, Eastwood, Redford – are household names, or at least are widely known.
Playwrights have become screen writers (e.g., Harold Pinter); artists art directors
(e.g., Boris Levin); photographers cinematographers (e,g, James Wong Howe),
and stage actors movie stars (e.g., Gregory Peck and Marlon Brando).
Through movies and television shows, cleverly crafted in ways meant to
attract, engage and keep an audience’s attention, the public is bombarded with
stories and images, produced by others who continuously shape our
understanding and perception of history and reality. Mass communications
expert Matthew McCombs writes:
Over time the issues emphasized in news reports
become the issues regarded as most important among
the public. The agenda of the news media becomes, to a
considerable degree, the agenda of the public. In other
words, the news media sets the public agenda.
(McCombs, 2004, 2)
This is even more true in the case of movies, and of television in general,
because these influence the way we form our opinions on a whole range of
subjects including Nazism, Hitler, Stalin, Communism and the Soviet Union. That
the mere mention of the names of Hitler or Stalin still generates passionate
controversy today is evidence of this conditioning process. Both men and their
respective regimes are dead and gone yet their names and legacies linger on
among a public increasingly ignorant of most things. That they are the subject of
discussion in this paper is only further evidence of that conditioning.
Let us explore the relationship between the media and social conditioning
further. By 1960 in the United States movies were being shown in some 18,000
locations throughout the nation (Neale, 323, 2012). Although attendance figures
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vary, there is no question that movies were seen by millions of people per week.
(The House Committee on Un-American Activities reported that in 1947 the figure
was over 85,000,000 (HCUA, 1947, 1)). Other estimates are 90 million in 1946 to 46
million in 1953, to 44 million in 1965 (Neale, 328, n. 16, 2012).
As the figures cited above indicate, during the twenty years after the end of
World War Two, attendance in movie theaters substantially declined. However,
that in no way meant that movies were losing their popularity. In fact quite the
contrary. The same period experienced the emergence of television which, by
1960, had become the “hot new medium,” with 90 percent of American homes
equipped with sets (Wasko, 380, 2012). This furnished the movie industry a new
outlet for distributing its movies and further extending its reach. Hollywood
adopted various strategies for co-existing and exploiting television. By 1952,
television subsidiaries were formed by Columbia (Screen Gems), Universal
(United World Features), and Monogram (Interstate Television); by 1964, six
Hollywood companies represented 45 percent of the domestic market for
syndicated TV series (Wasko, 378, 3012). Hollywood also began broadcasting
major feature films on television. Feature films provided up to 48 percent of the
programing for independent stations, and by the mid-1960s television was heavily
dependent on Hollywood-produced programming. Finally, studios diversified
through the purchase of television networks (Wasko, 379 f, 2012). The Hollywood
studio executive credited for recognizing the potential of television as an
instrument for promoting and distributing movies was Walt Disney. Disney
explained, “Through television I can reach my audience. I can talk to my audience.
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They are the audience that want to see my pictures” (Wasko, 381, 2012).
Television thus proved to be a boom for the industry which was now virtually
guaranteed instant access into almost every household in the United States.
Movie studios also create the audiences to whom they want to sell (Denby,
10, 2012). They can neither afford to wait for cues as to what the public wants nor
can they engage in guesswork about prevailing popular trends. They have to
create the market. This is achieved by prepping their audience through
advertising and then producing a product that the audience will want to watch. If
this succeeds, as it often does, it has such a profound effect as to even introduce
new words and catch-phrases that become part of everyday language. Examples
of the latter are “Go ahead, make my day” from the 1974 movie Sudden Impact
and “Show me the money!” from the 1996 movie Jerry Maguire. Thus movies
shape our language and through it what we think. The image of a tall, menacinglooking white police detective in Sudden Impact pointing a cocked and fully
loaded .347 Magnum handgun at the head of a terrified black man and coldly
uttering the words “Go ahead, make my day,” conveys an unmistakable set of
messages pertaining to the police, the nature of crime, the treatment of
lawbreakers, the law, and race.
Now, what happens inside the minds of the audience as they are watching
a movie? It is that the images being displayed on the screen become transformed
into something that the audience believes to be real or treats as real. What we see
on the screen we believe to be true, even if we cognitively understand it to be
fiction. Social philosopher Dominic M. McIver Lopes writes:
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There is no intrinsic or phenomenological difference
between experiences as of actual objects and events in
movies and experiences as of fictional ones. The
content of cinematic experience, we may say, draws no
ontological distinctions. Indeed, this is part of what
makes film fictions so convincing – and potentially so
dangerous (McIver Lopes, 1997, 345)
McIver Lopes’ findings are only partially disputed by film historian Richard Allen
who writes:
Contemporary film theorists construe the film spectator
as a passive observer of the image who is duped into
believing that it is real. In fact, as I shall argue, the film
spectator knows it is only a film and actively participates
in the experience of illusion that the cinema affords.
(Allen, 1995, 3)
It is the active participation alluded to by Allen that engages the spectator and
blurs the line between reality and fiction, and which, in the words of Soviet film
maker Dziga Vertov, helps the audience see the world from a fresh perspective
(Petric, 2012, 112). For instance, the 1956 movie The Ten Commandments depicts
a handsome, virile and heroic Moses decisively defeating his political rival and
step-brother, the sinister and venal Ramses II, and leading his people out of the
land of Egypt with the blessing of the Almighty. What we are seeing is fiction, and
is recognized as such, yet while we are watching it we feel like it is true. The
suggestive power of the imagery is irresistible. The scenes of a triumphant Moses,
representing all that is good, and the vanquished Ramses, thoroughly humiliated
and his army drowned, are imbedded in our psyche and incorporated into our
view of the world. The political message, that freedom is ordained and that those
who oppose it are doomed, is unmistakable. The timing of the movie’s release,
during the height of the Cold War, is more than coincidental. (One might add that
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at the time, and for a good deal afterwards, Communist regimes claimed a similar
inevitability through Marxist dialectic, first proclaimed in the Communist
Manifesto, of the triumph of Socialism.) Likewise, through a plethora of other
movies the audience learns how a saloon is supposed to look in a Western, how
extraterrestrials appear, and that a romance is doomed if one partner is staring
straight-ahead in the direction of the camera (Schweinitz, xiv, 2011). Film
historian Jorg Schweinitz writes: “The audience has learned all this not through
experience in their everyday lives outside the media (insofar as such an existence
is possible) but over the course of many years of spectatorship in the intertextual
space of filmic imagination” (Schweinitz, xiv, 2011).
Movies transmit streams of images reflecting the movie studio’s
understanding of reality. This understanding shapes the message that the studio
wants to convey, which is then transmitted to the audience in the form of
stereotypes. Social psychologists Charles Stangor and Mark Schaller write:
In modern society, the form by which most stereotypes
are transmitted is through the mass media – literature,
television, movies, newspapers …. (Stangor and Schaller,
1996, 12)
The term stereotype is another word for category; to stereotype is to categorize.
Stereotyping allows us to compartmentalize our thinking, that is, to group things
in categories, which helps to streamline our understanding of the world and
determine what is true. This includes the way we perceive people, who we
categorize as “us” and “them (Fiske, 2005, 37).” Social psychologist G. W. Allport
writes:
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The human mind must think with the aid of categories
(the term is equivalent here to generalizations). Once
formed, categories are the basis for normal
prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process.
Orderly living depends on it. (Allport, 1979, 20).
Stereotyping in turn affects the way we learn and what we learn. Stangor and
Schaller write:
As mental representations of the world, stereotypes
influence what information is sought out, attended to,
and remembered about members of social groups, as
well as influencing social behavior (Stangor and
Schaller, 1996, 6)
Stereotyping is as natural as breathing, and as with breathing, as long as we live
the tendency to stereotype never stops.
Watching a movie involves two parties: the source – the creator of the
movie, and the recipient – the spectator. The movie itself is a surrogate for the
person who created it. Both the creator of the movie and the spectator perceive
the world based on stereotypes. Schweinitz writes, “[S]tereotypes exist as mental
constructs in the minds of individuals … including producers and recipients of
texts” (Schweinitz, 2011, 39). In the process of watching a movie, the spectator is
exposed to its stereotypical material, which is now doing the thinking for the
spectator who is actively absorbing, and vicariously experiencing, all the sounds
and images stereotypes being conveyed. Critical thinking plays no part in the
process. For instance, in the movie Ben Hur the title character, Judah Ben Hur, a
Jewish prince living under Roman occupation in Palestine, is portrayed as a
victim of oppression and injustice. Throughout the movie Ben Hur’s Jewish
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identity is repeatedly emphasized. This evokes feelings of sympathy and empathy
not only for the character but for the people he metaphorically symbolizes – Jews.
Since Ben Hur is a victim, all Jews are now victims, which is the image of Jews
that, for whatever reason, the studio wants to convey to the audience, which was
in marked contradiction of much that came before it. From this moment forth this
stereotype becomes reinforced. Such stereotypes become, in Schweinitz’s words,
“cultural signs,” which in turn become incorporated into our mainstream culture
and are henceforth construed as fact (Schweinitz, 2011, xiv).
Movies alter our knowledge. Things that we see on the screen become
incorporated in our personal information. This storage is an automatic process
(Barsalou, 1992, 65). In a crime drama we think we learn something about the
police and criminals; in a court room drama we learn something about the system
of justice; in a war movie we think we learn something about war; in a romance
we learn something about love; and in a movie about Hitler or Stalin we learn
something about them. We vicariously experience what the characters are
experiencing on the screen. That the source of the knowledge is a work of fiction
is irrelevant; it is the experience of watching that counts. While watching the
American soldiers storm Omaha Beach and fight the Nazis in The Longest Day,
the audience is there too, absorbing the sights and sounds of the event and
incorporating it in their memory for future reference. From that movie the
audience learns that Americans are resilient, valiant and victorious, lessons that
are remembered.
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Movies also have a kind of archival effect. Film historian Marcus Stiglegger
writes:
The great success, as well as the influence, of TV
programs and films such as Holocaust (1978) and
Schindler’s List (1993) on public opinion about historical
events – especially in Germany – strongly suggests that
the worldwide audience is more open to fictionalized
history than to more challenging essayistic work such as
Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985). (Stiglegger, 2012, 1).
Stiglegger asks if cinema has reached the status of an historical archive for
some audiences. The answer to that question is: it has.
Today the movies are a modern historical archive. This is a function of a
mental process called visual imagery which allows the human mind to retain
imagined images after the actual perceived image is gone (Posner and Raichle,
1994, 88). There are many major historical events, personages or eras in history
for which information can be found in a full length motion picture, which are
understood to be authoritative sources, even though they are works of fiction. It
must also be remembered that history itself is subjective. The events of the past
are open to interpretation. Hence, there is no one who can say with absolute
certainty that, for instance, Oliver Stone’s production of Alexander (2004) is
entirely historically inaccurate (although the temptation is very great) or that the
portrayal of Lincoln in Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1940) is completely incorrect. And
even if the facts are stretched for dramatic purposes, the audience still learns
about these characters and the period of time in which they lived. The movie itself
becomes part of the history.
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Why is an audience more receptive to fictionalized history, which in the
strict sense of the word is not even history, then to the documentary format,
which is nonfiction and presumably based in facts? The reason is because fiction
appeals to the emotions. For instance, the movie Gone with the Wind is about the
Civil War and the South in transition. The movie cleverly plays to a wide range of
emotions – anger, loss, sorrow, redemption, love, hate, happiness, sadness –
which transforms the story, and therefore the war, into something personal,
meaningful and worth remembering. Although a work of fiction, the movie, which
is still popular today, is now part of an imagined historical archive. That it
embellishes facts and is entirely a work of fiction is secondary.
Motion pictures as archival sources are organized in different categories,
or genres, of film. There are biographies such as The Jolson Story (1946), war
movies such as Thirty Seconds over Tokyo (1944), disaster movies such as
Titanic (1997), and histories such as El Cid (1961). Often, movies cross into two or
more genres. Thus a war movie may double as a biography, examples being The
Gallant Hours (1960) and To Hell and Back (1955). Often, the same subject is
treated in several movies. For instance, one can learn at least something about
the origins of Christianity by watching Quo Vadis (1951), The Robe (1953), Ben
Hur (1959), King of Kings (1961), The Greatest Story Ever Told (1965), The Last
Temptation of Christ (1997), and The Passion of the Christ (2004). The
combinations of movies containing information about topics of historical interest
are almost endless. That these are commercial rather than academic products is
less important than how the public perceives and receives them as credible
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sources of information. Regarding Thirty Seconds over Tokyo, a review of the
movie in Variety on December 31, 1943, included this statement: “After Doolittle
finally tells them of their mission to bomb Japan, the war becomes a highly
personalized thing (italics added) through the actions of these crew members.”
Through this movie the public learns about the war in the Pacific, why the US was
fighting, the servicemen actually doing the fighting, and how the US intended to
win.
In the late 1930s complaints were raised that Hollywood was producing in
support of US involvement in the European war. Immediately prior to US entry,
the American public had generally been in favor of providing material assistance
to the British and in the form of Lend-Lease. However, there was little support for
direct military involvement. At the time, Adolf Hitler was not universally
considered a threat; in fact, in the United States he was admired by some. Even
after Kristallnacht, in November 1938, when Nazi anti-Semitism erupted with a
fury that shocked and disgusted much of the world, the United States maintained
diplomatic relations (albeit on a lower level than previously)with the Nazi regime.
American hero and US Army pilot Charles Lindbergh, who lived in England and
France in the late 1930s and met with high-ranking military officials of Britain,
France and Germany in 1938, was outspoken in opposing the US becoming
involved in a European war. Not only did Lindbergh believe that the British and
French were ill-prepared to fight, he also believed it would be a great mistake to
fight Hitler. Lindbergh argued that Hitler’s destruction would “lay Europe open to
the rape, loot and barbarism of Soviet Russia’s forces, causing the possibly fatal
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wounding of Western civilization” (Lindbergh, 1978, 177). Other prominent
organizations that opposed US entry into the war were the Communist Party (until
June of 1941), the American Youth Congress, the Mothers’ Crusade, the
Paul Revere Sentinels, the Women’s Neutrality League, and individuals such as
journalist John T. Flynn and General Robert E. Wood of the America First
Committee, socialist Norman Thomas, Father Charles Coughlin, and Senators
Robert La Follette (R-Wisconsin), Gerald Nye (R-North Dakota), and Burton
Wheeler (D-Montana) (Johnson, 1960, 174-175).
However, despite considerable popular ambivalence over whether to enter
the war, Hollywood produced several major feature films which seemed to
advocate both an anti-Nazi and pro-war position. These movies include
Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), Foreign Correspondent (1940), The Great
Dictator (1940), The Mortal Storm (1940), Sergeant York (1941), A Yank in the RAF
(1941), and Man Hunt (1941). Although ostensibly a comedy, the theme of The
Great Dictator is unmistakable: that Hitler and Mussolini pose a threat to the
peace of the world and must be stopped. (As well, of course, that they were
vicious fools who could be stopped.) The Mortal Storm similarly makes no effort
to disguise its anti-Nazi message. In response, a Senate subcommittee on
Interstate Commerce was created to investigate “Motion Picture and Radio
Propaganda.” Studio executives Harry Warner and Darryl F. Zanuck, and the
studios’ attorney (and former Republican Presidential candidate) Wendell Willkie,
defended the industry against charges that films were being used to promote
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intervention. The subcommittee’s proceedings were only abandoned when the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (Neve, 2012, 389-390).
With the entry of the US in the war, the federal government and the motion
picture industry joined forces to whip up public support for the war effort.
President Roosevelt created the Office of War Information, which included the
Bureau of Motion Pictures. In 1942 the BMP issued a Government Information
Manual for the Motion Picture Industry. This manual detailed how Hollywood
should fight the war. According to the manual, the war was “a fight for democracy
and the ‘Four Freedoms’ against the forces and values of fascism” (Neve, 2012,
390). By late 1942, Hollywood was making movies which stressed themes such as
inclusiveness, self-sacrifice and cooperation. The movie studios were fully
committed to winning the war. Warner Brothers took the lead in contributing to
this propaganda. Many of the Warner Brothers movies are today considered
classics. They include Yankee Doodle Dandy (1942), Casablanca (1943), Edge of
Darkness (1943) and Watch on the Rhine (1943). These were made not just for
entertainment, but to convey and promote a political message: that the US
represents principles worth defending. The scenes in Yankee Doodle Dandy of
James Cagney and the entire ensemble singing “I’m a Yankee Doodle Dandy” and
“You’re a Grand Old Flag” accompanied by a bevy of American flags waving in
the breeze convey an image of the United States as strong, united and rallying
around the flag. Studio head Jack Warner explained that these movies were
meant to help people “understand the peace and the victory” (Neve, 2012, 390).
By November 1942, the Hollywood office of the BMP exercised ‘an influence over
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an American mass medium never equaled before or since by a government
agency” (Neve, 2012, 391). From this partnership between government and
Hollywood, one fact emerges – the role played by the American motion picture
industry as a conduit for propaganda.
From December 7, 1941 until the end of the war in August 1945, the United
States and the Soviet Union, united by their mutual opposition to Hitler, were
allies. Despite this commonality of purpose, movie studios, in an effort to avoid
being accused of being Communist or fronting for Communists, tended to shy
away from movies that were overtly supportive of the Soviet regime. Nevertheless,
during the war several major motion pictures were released which extolled the
heroism and fortitude of the Russian people in their fight against German
aggression while refraining from mentioning the Soviet system. Such movies
include The North Star (1943), Three Russian Girls (1943), Why We Fight Part 5 The Battle of Russia (1943), Days of Glory (1944), Song of Russia (1944), and
Counter Attack (1945). Only one, Mission to Moscow (1943) was relentlessly proStalin, even supporting the purges. After the war, it, along with North Star and
Song of Russia were used as evidence supporting charges that Hollywood was
using movies to disseminate Communist propaganda (HCUA, 1947, 5-55).
At the same time the American film industry was producing works
denigrating the Nazis and anything German. German characters were shown as
sinister, cunning, untrustworthy, devious, arrogant, militaristic, boastful, nasty,
and cowardly. They spoke English with heavy German accents. Nazism was
discredited and mocked and Adolf Hitler was ridiculed and lampooned. The anti-
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Nazi theme can be found in many movies including the Walt Disney cartoons Der
Fuehrer's Face (1943), Spirit of ’43 (1943), and Education for Death: The Making of
the Nazi (1943) as well as in a number of full length films, some of which are
today also considered classics. Those include Casablanca (1942), Commandos
Strike at Dawn (1942), Desperate Journey (1942), Hitler – Dead or Alive (1942), The
Devil with Hitler (1942), Paris Calling (1942), Edge of Darkness (1943), Hitler's
Children (1943), Sahara (1943), The Cross of Lorraine (1943), Lifeboat (1944),
None Shall Escape (1944), The Hitler Gang (1944), and Waterfront (1944).
While Hollywood was busy making movies to bolster public support for the
war, the German film industry was also busy making propaganda movies.
Some movies sought to emulate Hollywood musicals and comedies and were
purely escapist fare, suggesting a Germany that was happy and carefree. Other
movies contained anti-British themes. These movies include Titanic (1943), Ohm
Kruger (Uncle Kruger) (1941) with Academy Award winner Emil Jannings,
Carl Peters (1941) and Mein Leben fur Irland (My Life for Ireland) (1941). Movies
with anti-Semitic themes include Jud Suss (The Jew Suss) (1940), Der ewige Jude
(The Eternal Jew) (1940) and The Rothschilds (1940). The Rothschilds closes with
a shot of a Jewish star superimposed over all of England. Stukas (1941)
dramatizes the deeds of the dashing pilots of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force).
The German motion picture industry also produced hundreds of weekly
newsreels entitled Die Deutsche Wochenschau (the German Weekly News). These
newsreels reported on the war. Each was about twenty minutes long and was
accompanied by dramatic narration and bombastic music. Many contained
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graphic scenes of combat, destruction and death. Die Deutsche Wochenschau
dated February 26, 1941 shows a somber and serious Adolf Hitler, accompanied
by Hermann Goering and a large contingent of German senior military officers, at
a public ceremony solemnly placing a wreath at the coffin of a soldier who had
died “in service to the Reich”; Hitler is also shown paying his respects to a woman
(perhaps the soldier’s mother). Die Deutsche Wochenschau dated July 9, 1941
shows German soldiers invading the Soviet Union, destroying Soviet defenses,
being welcomed as liberators, and rounding up Jews. Die Deutsche Wochenschau
of July 21, 1941 shows graphic panoramic scenes of an entire city, purportedly
Smolensk, completely gutted, allegedly by the retreating Bolsheviks, further
evidence of Soviet wantonness. The newsreel for Christmas 1942 shows scenes of
Germans soldiers at the front, from the Arctic to the deserts of North Africa, and
German civilians at home, celebrating Christmas, including German children
bringing presents to injured soldiers in a hospital. It also had scenes purporting to
show captured American soldiers (“Americanischer gefangenen”) looking beaten,
tired and dejected. Die Deutsche Wochenschau from June 14, 1944 shows German
army and SS troops fighting the Allied armies in France, scenes of destroyed
Allied tanks, aircraft, and other equipment, and Allied soldiers taken prisoner. The
final newsreel in this series was produced in March 1945.
After the war, with the Nazi threat gone and the start of the Cold War and
the division of Europe into Western and Soviet spheres, Hollywood turned its
attention to the threat of international Communism and its chief proponent, the
Soviet Union. Responding to political pressure from the House Committee on Un-
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American Activities, whose members “saw the film industry as vulnerable to
charges of communist subversion” (Neve, 2012, 391), Hollywood soon was
producing an array of motion pictures with themes that were anti-Communist and
anti-Soviet. These movies include The Iron Curtain (1948), The Red Menace (1949),
I Married a Communist (1949), The Big Lift (1950), Invasion U.S.A. (1952), I Was a
Communist for the FBI (1955), The Journey (1959), One-Two-Three (1961),
The Manchurian Candidate (1962), From Russia with Love (1963), Doctor Zhivago
(1966), The Deadly Affair (1966), Torn Curtain (1966), Ice Station Zebra (1968),
Topaz (1969), The Spy Who Loved Me (1977), and Red Scorpion (1989).
As with the anti-Nazi movies, these portray the Soviet Union and its agents
in strictly stereotypical fashion. Either they are concocting nefarious plans to
subvert the West, either through espionage or by direct military action, or
behaving like martinets, thus inviting ridicule. The larger theme was that the
Soviet Union and its allies are sinister, utterly unscrupulous and had to be
checked. One-Two-Three includes scenes of a divided Berlin as a backdrop for a story
that highlights Cold War tensions through comedy, thus sugaring the message. Doctor
Zhivago depicts a Russia under the yoke of Bolshevik rule and includes the chilling lines,
“The personal life is dead in Russia.” and “private life is dead for a man with any
manhood.” Torn Curtain plays up the threat posed by Soviet espionage. Red Dawn
depicts a United States under a brutal Soviet military occupation. The Manchurian
Candidate includes graphic scenes of Soviet agents brainwashing an American Korean
war veteran into becoming a political assassin inside the United States.
While Hollywood was selling the anti-Bolshevik line to the American people, the
Soviet film establishment for years produced a slew of full length features that portrayed
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the Russian people and Soviet society in a most positive, upbeat, and optimistic light.
These movies include Circus (1936), Volga-Volga (1938), Kotovsky (1942), The Stone
Flower (1946), The Ballad of Siberia (1947) and The Cranes are Flying (1957). Volga-Volga,
a comedy, is said to have been Joseph Stalin’s favorite movie (The Hype, online). When
watching these movies, one would never know that Soviet Union was a massive police
state.
Although Nazi Germany had been defeated and replaced by the Soviet Union as
the arch-villain in movies, Nazism remained a favorite target for the American film
industry. In 1960 Israel captured, kidnapped and tried accused German war criminal
Adolf Eichmann, one of the key perpetrators of the Holocaust. This event marked the
start of the second phase of Hollywood’s Nazi bashing. In this phase the stories are more
complex and the characterizations of the Germans generally more subtle and substantive
then those produced during the war. Nevertheless the underlying theme remains
unchanged: that Nazism is a detestable aberration that was responsible for causing

misery and death and that anyone who was a Nazi was emotionally defective,
intellectually hapless, wantonly sadistic, and morally corrupt. Movies that touch
on these themes include Judgment at Nuremberg (1961), The Longest Day (1962),
The Great Escape (1963), The Pawnbroker (1964), The Sound of Music (1964), The
Train (1964), Von Ryan’s Express (1965), Is Paris Burning? (1966) The Dirty Dozen
(1968), The Damned (1969), Patton (1970), QB VII (1974 TV miniseries), Seven
Beauties (1975), The Boys From Brazil (1978), Holocaust (1978 TV miniseries),
Das Boot (1981), Winds of War (1983 TV miniseries), Sophie’s Choice (1982),
Schindler’s List (1993), Saving Private Ryan (1994), and The Reader (2008).
Judgment at Nuremberg includes this line, “If there is to be any salvation for
Germany, we who know our guilt must admit it... whatever the pain and

Weiss 22

humiliation.” The Dirty Dozen depicts senior German army officers as wastrels
and drunkards. QB VII deals with the theme of Nazi physicians as recalcitrant
criminals. Das Boot, featuring an all-German cast, depicts German naval
personnel as disillusioned; in one scene Hermann Goering is called a “fat slob.”
Schindler’s List contains graphic scenes of German guards brutalizing and
terrorizing Jews. The Reader depicts a female former concentration camp guard
who is not only complicit in the burning deaths of hundreds of Jews, but is a
functional illiterate and pedophile as well – perfect prerequisites for achieving
gainful employment under the Nazis. Although indicted and convicted of war
crimes, the character projects a certain pathos which brings out the woman’s
essential banality and the corrupting effect of the system she served.
Movies in which Hitler himself is a principal character include Hitler (1962),
Hitler: The Last Ten Days (1973), The Death of Adolf Hitler (1973), The Bunker
(1981), Downfall (Der Untergang) (2004), Hitler – The Rise of Evil (2003 TV series),
Valkyrie (2008) and Inglorious Basterds (2009). In these movies Hitler is invariably
portrayed as shrill, moody, short-tempered, easily distracted, and prone to verbal
outbursts. For instance, Downfall contains (apparently accurate) scenes of a
disheveled and wild-eyed Hitler ranting and wandering about the bunker as the
Reich is in its final death throe. Hitler – The Rise of Evil depicts a young, scowling,
pouting Hitler who abuses animals and screams his way to power. Inglorious
Basterds includes depictions of a gloating, boastful and vain Hitler dressed in full
Nazi regalia, which is pure caricature. Regarding Hitler’s behavior, Dr. Eduard
Bloch, Hitler’s family physician for two years, said of him, “As a boy he was quiet,
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well-mannered and neatly dress” (Bloch, 1943). (This is not in any way to
diminish the magnitude of his later crimes.)
Omitted from this discussion are titles from the hundreds of documentaries
that have been produced about Hitler or include Hitler, and the almost countless
number of parodies of Hitler published on video-sharing websites. Based on the
sheer volume of videos devoted to Hitler online, it is apparent that Adolf Hitler,
although gone, is far from forgotten, his name and image kept alive in the myriad
of movies and videos with a worldwide audience. It is the rare person indeed that
has not heard of the name Adolf Hitler.
Hitler and the Nazi regime are so widely associated with the perpetration of
war crimes that it may come as surprise to the reader that during World War Two
the Wehrmacht commissioned a War Crimes Bureau staffed by military judges to
systematically collect and analyze evidence of crimes committed by the Allies,
including the United States and the Soviet Union. This evidence was to be used to
prosecute Allied civilian and military personnel for allegedly violating
international law. The Bureau investigated numerous complaints of alleged
infractions and violations of the rules of war, and reported their findings to the
German government, which, through diplomatic channels via so-called protecting
powers (in which capacity the United States had served on behalf of the British
prior to the US entry in the war) filed numerous official protests. To today’s
reader, the idea of the regime led by Adolf Hitler alleging violations of
international law by the Allies may seem the height of absurdity, but when these
protests were filed Germany had not yet lost the war. The outcome was still far
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from settled, and so their allegations could not be discounted or dismissed as
grumblings of a bad loser. Had the war ended differently, they might have been
taken seriously in some neutral quarters. Further, these protests were being
transmitted by official third-parties who bore witness to their contents and
seriousness. The Nuremburg War Crimes trial had not yet occurred and Germans,
including Adolf Hitler, had yet to be indicted for anything. Questions of culpability
were still an open book.
During the war, the German government also officially accused the Soviet
Union of “having murdered and tortured Germans prisoners in bestial and
indescribable fashion” (de Zayas, 1979, 88). 1 German officers believed that the
Red Army did not observe the laws of war. The International Committee of the
Red Cross was refused permission to visit POW camps in the Soviet Union (de
Zayas, 1979, 95). After the US entered the war, Germany gave no indication that it
would try US and British POWs for war crimes. However, that policy changed
after December 16, 1943, when the Soviet Union initiated the first war crimes trial
against three captured German soldiers accused of having murdered Soviet
citizens in gas vans. The German soldiers were convicted and executed on
December 19, 1943. The proceedings were attended by numerous British and
American journalists (de Zayas, 1979, 99). Eighty German POWs were also
executed by Free French Forces on September 2, 1944 (de Zayas, 1979, 152).

1

De Zayas’ book, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, is controversial and the allegations it contains have not
been independently corroborated by any court of law nor were any Allied governments or Allied military forces
discussed in the book ever formally accused or convicted of war crimes. Further, the Nazi regime bears full
responsibility for having started the war and for the consequences of the actions taken by their adversaries in
response.
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A German report alleged the mutilation of corpses and the maltreatment of
soldiers by civilians on Crete (de Zayas, 1979, 157). German investigators
determined that on July 1, 1941 in the Ukraine Russians soldiers had massacred
153 captured German soldiers (de Zayas, 1979, 163). Regarding allegations of
mistreatment of German POWs by the Russians during the war, de Zayas writes:
From 1941 to 1945 the Bureau compiled several
thousand depositions, reports, and captured papers
which, if nothing else, indicate that the killing of German
prisoners of war upon capture or shortly after
interrogation was not an isolated occurrence. (de Zayas,
1979, 164)
The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau also investigated reports of “violent
propaganda” which included scurrilous and inflammatory language
dehumanizing the Germans. An article in the September 9, 1942 edition of the
newspaper Red Star included these comments:
The Germans are not human beings. Henceforth the
word German means to us the most terrible curse. From
now on the word German will trigger your rifle. We shall
not speak any more. We shall not get excited. We shall
kill. If you have not killed at least one German a day, you
have wasted that day. … Kill the German – this is what
your children beseech you to do. Kill the German – this
is the cry of your Russian earth. Do not waver. Do not let
up. Kill.” (de Zayas, 1979, 168-169)
Other alleged incidents investigated by the Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau
include the execution of wounded German soldiers by Russian soldiers in the
Crimea on January 1, 1942 (de Zayas, 1979, 180-182); the alleged existence of a
so-called “Stalin Order” ordering all German prisoners of war should be shot
immediately (which never happened) (de Zayas, 1979, 173-177); the alleged
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murder of 596 German POWs and other personnel by Soviet soldiers in Grischino,
north of Stalino, on February 18, 1943 (de Zayas, 1979, 187-191); the “murder of
thousands of Ukrainian and Polish political prisoners by the NKVD” in Lvov,
Poland in June 1941 (de Zayas, 1979, 214-227); the 1940 liquidation of some
14,700 Polish prisoners of war by Soviet authorities at the Katyn forest near
Smolensk in the Soviet Union in 1940, discovered and investigated in the spring
of 1943 (de Zayas, 1979, 228-239); the discovery in 1941 in Vinnitsa of mass
graves containing the remains of thousands of Ukrainians (9,439 were counted)
(de Zayas, 1979, 240-244); and attacks by Allied aircraft on German hospital ships
(de Zayas, 1979, 261-268).
In a long letter to President Roosevelt dated April 23, 1943, Stalin
vehemently denied Soviet responsibility for the Katyn forest massacre.
Dispensing with the usual diplomatic formalities in favor of blunt language
interspersed with stock Soviet clichés, and adopting a tone of self-righteous
anger and indignation, Stalin disclaimed all Soviet involvement and branded as a
sham efforts by the Polish government in exile, based in London and led by
Wladyslaw Sikorski, to investigate the matter:
The governments of Sikorski and Hitler have involved in
these “investigations” the International Red Cross
which is compelled to take part under conditions of a
terroristic regime with its gallows and mass
extermination of a peaceful population, in this
investigation farce, under the stage management of
Hitler. (Butler, 2005, 124)
Stalin also accused the Polish government in exile, which was a member of the
Allied coalition fighting Hitler, of conspiring with the Germans to use the Katyn

Weiss 27

forest incident to discredit the Soviet Union:
At the time when the people of the Soviet Union are
shedding their blood in the bitter struggle against
Hitlerite Germany and straining every effort to rout the
common foe of all liberty-loving democratic countries,
the government of Mr. Sikorski, pandering to Hitler’s
tyranny, is dealing a treacherous blow to the Soviet
Union.
All these circumstances force the Soviet Government to
infer that the present government of Poland, having
fallen into the path of collusion with the Hitler
government, has actually discontinued relations of
alliance with the USSR and assumed a hostile attitude
toward the Soviet Union. (Butler, 2005, 124)
Three days later, on April 26, 1943, Roosevelt sent Stalin this reply:
I can well understand your problem but I hope in present
situation you can find means to label your action as a
suspension of conversation with the Polish Government
in exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic
relations.
It is my view that Sikorski has not acted in any way with
Hitler gang, but rather that he made a stupid mistake in
taking the matter up with the International Red Cross.
(Butler, 2005, 126)
The warmth of Roosevelt’s reply and his attempt to calm the Soviet dictator is
indicative of Roosevelt’s skill as a diplomat and the goodwill he felt for Stalin.
Whether Roosevelt’s goodwill was misguided is a matter for speculation.
Both Hitler and Stalin were implicated in the Katyn Forest massacre. Each
one accused the other of having committed the crime. Given the reputations of
the respective complainants, both of whom had a motive for heaping blame on
the other, establishing culpability remained elusive. To Stalin, this matter was
serious enough to risk creating a breach between the Allies in the middle of the
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war and to Hitler, this matter was worth exploiting as a way of sowing disunity
within the ranks of his enemies. The controversy was driven not by the desire for
justice but by pure expediency. For by impugning one, the other would be
strengthened. That thousands of Polish POWs were murdered no one disputed.
On April 13, 1990 the Soviet Union admitted that its secret police, the NKVD,
committed the murders (Reuters, 4/13/90). In 1992 more evidence surfaced
showing that on March 5, 1940 the murders were ordered by the Politburo chaired
by Stalin (Chicago Tribune, 10/15/92). But one thing is certain: whether Stalin
personally signed a document authorizing the murders is of less importance than
the fact that they are now part of his legacy and that of the regime that for fifty
years sought to cover up a war crime. It also lends some small credibility to the
findings of Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau.
Pure expediency too had motivated Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to
sign the Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. Here both Hitler and Stalin
demonstrated willingness to put aside ideological differences and jeopardize
world peace in order to pursue their own respective foreign policy agendas.
Besides agreeing not to fight each other, Germany and the Soviet Union divided
Eastern Europe into respective spheres, one for Germany and the other for the
Soviet Union, giving each side carte blanche to invade and occupy those
countries located in their respective spheres. Most critically, the pact made
provisions for the elimination of Poland. This proviso gave Hitler the green light
to invade that country and start another war which three days later escalated into
World War Two. After the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, Count Ciano,
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Benito Mussolini’s Foreign Minister, directly warned the German foreign ministry
that an attack on Poland would lead to war with Britain and France (Sonntag and
Beddie, 2003, 79). Ciano’s warning was rejected. Both Hitler and Stalin share
responsibility for causing the war.
One can only marvel at how Stalin and Hitler tried to sucker deceive the
other, extending false feelers of friendship while concealing their real intentions.
Their sordid brinksmanship is without equal in history. By treating with Hitler,
Stalin was playing a high risk game with a man who had already double-crossed
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and who was looking for an excuse to
start a fight. For Hitler, treating with Stalin meant dealing with a man who was
looking for a dupe through which to destroy the West. Both were up to no good
and both were willing to employ any means to accomplish their aims.
If both Hitler and Stalin bear joint responsibility for having caused the war
and are implicated in the commission of war crimes, then the question arises as
to whether Hitler has been judged according to a double standard. Can the Nazi
regime be considered criminal and the USSR not? This raises a legal principle
called tu quoque. Tu quoque is a Latin term meaning “you also.” It operates as
follows: Party A accuses Party B of having violated a law, but Party A ostensibly
violated the same law, so Party B can claim innocence, or at least mitigation,
since Party A committed the same offense too. By invoking this defense, a
defendant can deflect or blunt a prosecution. It can also be used by a plaintiff to
rationalize their own actions. At the Nuremberg War Crimes trial some of the
defendants considered using tu quoque as a defense. However, except
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under narrow circumstances, it was not employed. Franz Von Papen, one of the
defendants at Nuremberg, called tu quoque a bad defense (Tusa and Tusa, 1985,
251). It was also disallowed by the court on the grounds that it would result in
“fishing expeditions” (Tusa and Tusa, 1985, 252). As the evidence showed, the
Nazi regime bore full responsibility for their actions and had no legal basis to
project blame onto their accusers or claim mitigating circumstances.
So, if that is the case, then why bring up German allegations of Allied war
crimes? The purpose is to show that applying the label “war criminal” alone
proves nothing. Throughout the war the Germans accused the Allies of war
crimes. But their accusations itself did not confer guilt. Although it is tempting to
label Hitler and Stalin names and complain about their actions, such expressions
of self-righteousness only reduce Hitler and Stalin to caricatures, deflects
attention away from the facts relating to their respective cases and opens up their
detractors to charges of hypocrisy. That Hitler and Stalin committed bad acts is a
given. That they acted on their own volition is a given. To label them as bad is
therefore superfluous. Besides, not everyone who knew them thought they were
bad. Hitler’s family physician, who was forced to flee from Austria, had good
things to say about the Fuhrer. It is what they did according to the record that
counts. Name calling and labeling merely perpetuates stereotypes.

Now it is time to examine who Hitler and Stalin were and what they actually
did. Comparing Hitler and Stalin implies that they were similar enough to warrant
comparison. Nevertheless, they also differed in fundamental ways. Hitler was an
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Austrian from Central Europe while Stalin was Georgian from the Caucasus.
Hitler served in the military while Stalin was rejected for military service. Hitler
was single (except for one day) while Stalin was married twice. Hitler had no
children while Stalin had two sons and a daughter. Hitler was a Nazi while Stalin
was a Communist. These are material differences and ideological which set both
men apart.
Hitler and Stalin also had much in common. Both were dictators, that is,
they had unlimited executive authority, free from legal constraints, meaning that
their orders were de facto law. Both led and were identified with radical political
parties – Hitler as head of the Nazi Party; Stalin as General Secretary of the
Communist Party. Prior to gaining power, both were political activists – Hitler as a
street agitator and Stalin as a revolutionary agent. Both claimed to represent the
interests of a specific social group – Hitler, the German Volk and Stalin, the
proletariat. Both employed terror to achieve their political aims – Hitler through
the Gestapo, and Stalin through a variety of Soviet security organizations. Both
surrounded themselves with a loyal clique of followers who did their master’s
bidding – Hitler with a group including SS commandant Heinrich Himmler,
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, and Reichmarshall Herman Goering
(Bullock, 1992, 321), and Stalin with associates such as Politburo members Lazar
Kaganovich, Soviet foreign minister Vyasheslav M. Molotov and state security
commissar Lavrenti Beria (Bullock, 1992, 114, 304). Both were brought up as
Christians, Hitler as Catholic and Stalin as Russian Orthodox, and later both
repudiated their Christian upbringing. Hitler said, “The best thing is to let
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Christianity die a natural death” (Hitler, Table Talks, 2000, 8, 48). Stalin wrote,
“[T]he world is by its very nature material … and that the world develops in
accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a
‘universal spirit’” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 412). Both had expansionist and
imperialistic ambitions (Rancour-Leferriere, 1988, 79). Finally, both were directly
responsible for the deaths of millions of people – Hitler as the perpetrator of the
Holocaust and initiator of the Second World War, and Stalin as author of
collectivization, the purges and the gulag. As to the actual number of victims,
political scientist R. J. Rummel offers these figures: 20,946,000 murdered by the
Nazis during the period 1933 to 1945 (Rummel, 1992, 6), and 5,104,000 murdered
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the period 1939 to June 1941
alone (Rummel, 1990, 127). According to Rummel, the total number of people
murdered by the Soviet government from 1917 to 1987 was 61,911,000 (Rummel,
1990, 1). Historian Richard Overy writes, “The regimes defined their enemies and
destroyed or removed them” (Overy, 2004, 634). Not surprisingly, the two
dictators on some level admired each other (Fest, 1975, 593).
Despite their similarities, which were substantial, some historians have
argued that one was worse than the other. Let us examine what two historians
have had to say on this matter. They are Joachim Fest and Alan Bullock. Fest
believes that Hitler was worse than Stalin. He argues that Hitler had “ … absolutely
no civilizing ideas” while Stalin’s “bloody despotism draped itself with promises
for the future ….” (Fest, 2002, 165). Fest’s statement warrants further scrutiny.

Weiss 33

Did Hitler really have absolutely no civilizing ideas? It is at least true that Hitler
had moments of insight. On August 2, 1941, Hitler said, “I don’t blame the small
man for turning Communist, but I blame the intellectual who did nothing but
exploit other people’s poverty for their own ends” (Hitler, 2000, 18) There is
nothing in this statement that is inherently or explicitly uncivil or unreasonable.
Further, it reveals that Hitler, the avowed enemy of Bolshevism, had sufficient
understanding to appreciate why someone would become a Communist.
Now, regarding Fest’s characterization of Stalin’s regime as a “bloody
despotism,” these words evoke negative images and could lead one to
reasonably conclude that Stalin was an ogre and the Soviet State an abomination.
Is such a conclusion accurate? Historian Robert Conquest would say yes. In his
book The Great Terror, which discusses Stalin’s role as the initiator of the great
purge of the late 1930s, Conquest writes: “Neither then nor later was his terrorism
wholly rational. He practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything that
opposed him but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic
character, contrary to his concepts” (Conquest, 1990, 66). So, at this point, the
question must be asked: who was actually worse: Hitler who, according to Fest,
had no civilizing ideas or Stalin who, according to two eminent historians, was
essentially a thug?
The issue becomes even cloudier when we introduce yet another source
that seems to refute both Fest and Conquest. That source is Adolf Hitler. On the
evening of July 11-12, 1941 Hitler, commenting on Stalin, said:
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Stalin is one of the most extraordinary figures in world
history. He began as a small clerk, and never stopped
being a clerk. Stalin owes nothing to rhetoric. He
governs from his office, thanks to a bureaucracy that
obeys his every nod and gesture. (Hitler, 2007, 9)
To Hitler, Stalin was the head bureaucrat of an administrative apparatus that was
completely subservient to his will. Hitler’s foreign office expressed similar views.
When Stalin took over the office of Chairman of the Council of People’s
Commissars in May 6, 1941 (the first time Stalin ever held a government post), the
German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Count von der Schulenburg, wrote,
“Stalin won his position of power in party and state solely by his personal
authority and by the aid of men devoted to him” (Sonntag and Beddie, 2003, 336).
Neither Hitler nor Schulenburg use language that explicitly or implicitly demonize
Stalin.
Another contemporary of Stalin’s actually held the Soviet leader in high
esteem. That person was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Despite the anti-Soviet bias that
pervaded the State Department and War Department during the war, Roosevelt
directed that the Soviet Union be treated fairly, with no strings attached.
Roosevelt himself developed a warm relationship with Stalin. He seemed to
genuinely like the Communist dictator. Evidence of Roosevelt’s feelings for Stalin
can be found in the series of correspondence between the two men during the
war. In a letter to Stalin dated April 11, 1942, Roosevelt wrote:
The American people are thrilled by the magnificent
fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in
the destruction of Hitler’s armies and material more than
we are doing now. I send you my sincere regards. (Butler,
2005, 64-65)
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In a letter to Roosevelt dated April 20, 1942, Stalin replied:
Let me thank you for the message which I received in
Moscow the other day. …. Please accept my sincere
regards and wishes of success in the fight against the
enemies of the United States of America. (Butler, 2005,
65)
In a letter dated August 8, 1942, Roosevelt asked Stalin for advice on whether to
send Wendell Willkie to the Soviet Union as part of a diplomatic mission. The
letter opens with this sentence:
I should like to have your frank opinion on the following
plan which I think may be useful.
and closes with this sentence:
Please tell me confidentially and frankly if you care to
have him come for a very short visit. (Butler, 2005, 82-83)
Four days later Stalin replied:
The Soviet Government takes a favorable view of Mr.
Wendell Willkie’s visit to the USSR and I can assure you
that he will be most cordially entertained. (Butler, 2005,
83)
October 5, 1942, Roosevelt wrote:
I send you my heartiest congratulations on the
magnificent achievements of the Soviet Armies
and my best wishes for your continued welfare.
(Butler, 2005, 92)
On November 19, 1942 Roosevelt wrote:
I do not have to tell you to keep up the good work. You
are doing that and I honestly feel that things everywhere
look brighter. (Butler, 2005, 97)
Regarding American air assistance in the Caucasus, Roosevelt, on December 16,
1942, wrote:
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Please let me know inform me by dispatch your desires
in this matter as soon as possible, as I truly want to help
all I can. (Butler, 2005, 104)
On February 4, 1943, Roosevelt wrote:
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States I congratulate you on your brilliant victory
in Stalingrad. (Butler, 2005, 114)
The next day Stalin sent Roosevelt this reply:
I thank you for the congratulations in connection with
the victory of the Soviet armies at Stalingrad. I express
confidence that the joint fighting operations of the
armed forces of the United States, of Great Britain and
of the Soviet Union will soon lead to victory over our
common enemy. (Butler, 2005, 115)
On February 22, 1943 Roosevelt wrote:
We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is
an inspiration to all of us, will continue. (Butler, 2005, 119)
The same day Roosevelt sent Stalin another letter which said:
On behalf of the people of the United States, I want to
express to the Red Army, on its twenty-fifth anniversary,
our profound admiration for its magnificent
achievements unsurpassed in all history. … The Red
Army and the Russian people have surely started the
Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have
earned the lasting admiration of the people of the
United States. (Butler, 2005, 119-120)
Two days later Stalin replied:
Please accept my sincere gratitude for your friendly
message on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the
Red Army and for your high praise of its fighting
successes. I share your confidence that these
successes will open the path to the final defeat of our
common foe who should and will be crushed by the
united might of our countries and of all freedom loving
peoples. (Butler, 2005, 120)
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Even Stalin was capable of showing gratitude. Of course, whether Stalin’s
solicitations were genuine or a cynical guise meant to extract favors from
the American president is another matter. Was Roosevelt being naïve? Historian
Susan Butler believes Roosevelt wanted to maintain friendly relations with Stalin
because he wanted to win the war and the peace that would follow (Butler, 2005,
10). Roosevelt’s true motivations can only be speculated about.
Stalin professed a desire to be friends with the United States. In a letter to
President Roosevelt dated January 18, 1939, Joseph Davies, US Ambassador to
the Soviet Union, reported:
The leaders of the Soviet government have stated to me
that there is only one government in the world that they
trust and that is the United States government under
your leadership. (Davies, 1941, 433).
In a letter to Roosevelt’s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, dated July 18, 1941,
Davis wrote:
I found among the leading Soviets a real friendliness to
the United States possibly based on the fact that there
was nothing that they had that we wanted, and that we
had nothing that they could take; so there was a natural
basis for a policy of “live and let live” between our two
peoples. (Davies, 1941, 496),
Roosevelt responded to Soviet overtures in kind and during the war the Soviet
Union proved a staunch ally.
The question of Stalin’s character becomes even more unsettled when we
introduce Stalin’s own words. Although excoriated by many historians today,
Stalin believed that his policies were right. In fact, he was proud of his
accomplishments. In April 1930, in a newspaper article published in Pravda,
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Stalin was asked, “Was the party right in pursuing the policy of accelerating
development to the utmost?” Stalin replied:
Yes, it was absolutely right. We had to spur on the
country, which was a hundred years behind, and which
was faced with mortal danger because it was behind.
Only in this way was it possible to enable the country to
quickly re-equip itself on the basis of modern technique
and emerge onto the highroad at last.
What exactly had the party under Stalin achieved? In a report delivered to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party on January 7, 1933, Stalin answers
that question:
We did not have an iron and steel industry, the
foundation for the industrialization of the country. Now
we have this industry.
We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have one.
We did not have an automobile industry. Now we have
one.
We did not have a machine-tool industry. Now we have
one.
We did not have a big and up-to-date chemical industry.
Now we have one.
We did not have a real and big industry for the
production of modern agricultural machinery. Now we
have one.
We did not have an aircraft industry. Now we have one.
Stalin goes on to list many more impressive accomplishments (Stalin, Leninism,
1942, 246-252, 258-262). He then compares the results achieved in the Soviet
Union with figures from the West: “While by the end of 1932 the volume of
industrial output in the USSR rose to 219 percent of the 1928 output, the volume
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of industrial output in the USA during the same period dropped to 56 percent, in
England to 80 percent, in Germany to 55 percent, in Poland to 54 percent” (Stalin,
Leninism, 1942, 248). Stalin rejected “all the talk of the bourgeois press about the
‘collapse’ of collectivization in the sphere of agriculture” and compared Soviet
accomplishments in agriculture with the condition of agriculture in the United
States. Stalin reported:
According to the figures of the United States
Department of Agriculture, the value of the gross
output of agriculture in the United States dropped from
$11,000,000,000 in 1929 to $5,000,000,000 in 1932, i.e.,
by more than 50 percent. (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 255)
Stalin also reported that in the Soviet Union unemployment had been abolished
while in the West unemployment was worsening. Stalin reported:
In the United States, according to official figures, the
number of employed workers in the manufacturing
industries alone has dropped from 8,500,000 in 1928 to
5,500,000 in 1932; and according to the figures of the
American Federation of Labor, the number of
unemployed in the United States, in all industries, at the
end of 1932, was 11,000,000. In Great Britain, according
to official statistics, the number of unemployed has
increased from 1,290,000 in 1928 to 2,800,000 in 1932.
In Germany, according to official figures, the number of
unemployed has increased from 1,376,000 in 1928 to
5,500,000 in 1932. This is the picture that is observed in
all the capitalist countries. Moreover, official statistics,
as a rule, minimize the number of unemployed; the total
number of those unemployed in the capitalist countries
ranges from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000. (Stalin, Leninism,
1942, 261)
If one was to believe Stalin, when compared to the situation in the West, the
Soviet Union was well on its way to becoming a workers’ paradise.
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As though to prove that his glowing reports of Soviet successes were not
merely self-serving, Stalin quoted verbatim reports from the Western press both
praising and criticizing the Five Year Plan. The New York Times (November 1932)
called it a “gamble” and a “ghastly failure.” The English newspaper, the Daily
Telegraph (November 1932), reported that “the scheme has quite clearly failed.”
The Polish newspaper Gazeta Polska (summer 1932) reported that “The situation
[in the rural districts] … has reached an impasse.” The English newspaper, The
Financial Times (November 1932), referred to the “breakdown of the Five Year
Plan,” while the Italian magazine Politica reported, “Catastrophe is evident.”
Other reports, however, presented a much more positive picture. The
French newspaper, Le Temps (January 1932) reported, “The U.S.S.R. has won the
first round, having industrialized herself without the aid of foreign capital.” In the
summer it later said that “in the contest with us the Bolsheviks have proved the
victors.” The British magazine, The Round Table, reported, “The developments
achieved under the Five Years Plan is astounding.” The Financial Times also
noted that “the progress made in machine construction cannot be doubted, and
the celebrations of it in the press and on the platform, glowing as they are, are
not unwarranted.” The Austrian newspaper, Die Neue Freie Presse (beginning of
1932), added, “We may curse Bolshevism, but we must understand it…. The Five
Year Plan is a new huge quantity which must be taken into account in every
economic calculation.” John Gibson Garvie, the chairman of the United
Dominions Trust (October 1932) said, “Russia is forging ahead while all too many
of our factories and shipyards lie idle…. Russia today is a country with a soul and
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an ideal …. I believe that the Russian objective is sound.” The American journal,
The Nation (November 1932), opined, “The four years of the Five-Year Plan have
witnessed truly remarkable developments. The face of the country is being
changed literarily beyond recognition. … Russia is passing quickly from the age
of wood into an age of iron, steel, concrete and motors. The English journal, The
Glasgow Forward (September 1932), reported (unsurprisingly):
Nobody can fail to notice the enormous amount of
building work that is going on….It has to be seen to be
believed. Our own war time efforts … are flea-bites to
what has been done in Russia…. So dismiss from your
heads the fantastic scare stories of the British press
that lies so persistently, so blatantly, so contemptibly
about Russia, and all the half-truths and misconceptions
that are circulated by the dilettante literary academic
intelligentsia that look at Russia patronizingly through
superior middle-class spectacles without having the
slightest understanding of what is going on.
Based on these figures and reports, Stalin concluded, not unreasonably, that the
Soviet system had the advantage over the capitalist system and “that the
capitalist countries are pregnant with proletarian revolution” (Stalin, Leninism,
1942, 236-240, 241).
Stalin also made another essential point: industrialization had to be
spurred on to protect the Soviet Union from impending attack. One could argue
that his fears were exaggerated. But were they? In 1921, Lenin warned that there
would be another world war:
The question of imperialist wars, of the international
policy of finance capital which dominates the whole
world, a policy the inevitably engenders new imperialist
wars, that inevitably causes an extreme intensification
of national oppression, pillage, brigandry and the
strangulation of weak, backward and small nationalities
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by a handful of “advanced” powers – this question has
been the keystone of the entire policy of all countries of
the globe since 1914. It is a question of life and death for
millions and millions of people. It is a question of
whether 20,000,000 people (as compared with the
10,000,000 who were killed in the war of 1914-1918 and
in the supplementary “minor” wars that are still going
on) are to be slaughtered in the next imperialist war,
which the bourgeoisie is preparing, which is growing
out of capitalism before our very eyes. It is a question of
whether that future war, which is inevitable (if capitalism
continues to exist), 60,000,000 people are to be maimed
(compared to the 30,000,000 maimed in the years 19141918). (Lenin, Selected Works, v.2, pt.2, 597-598)
Lenin’s warnings proved to be correct, even if his explanation was flawed.
Stalin believed that his policies were justified; his explanations seemed rational
and plausible. According to President Roosevelt, he was an ally worthy of lasting
admiration. Stalin believed, as US Ambassador Joseph Davies reported in 1938, that
he was doing what had to be done to save the cause (Davies, 1941, 303). For Stalin,
the decision to radically transform the Communist state from a backward peasant
country into a modern industrial power was “a matter of life and death” (SMS, video).
Opposition was out of the question; there was no time to waste. According to
Professor David Reynolds, Stalin “dragged Russia into the twentieth century, but it
could not have been accomplished without the utter ruthlessness that was his
trademark” (SMS, video).
Yet, despite the brutality of his methods, Stalin was still capable of
performing acts of friendship and showing affection. In August 1942, Churchill
flew to Moscow where he had a series of meetings with Stalin regarding the
conduct of the war. Offended by Stalin’s accusations of bad faith, Churchill was
ready to terminate the discussions and leave when Stalin invited him to his
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apartment for drinks. Churchill accepted and for six hours both men,
accompanied by Molotov, ate, drank, talked and became friends. During their
discussions, Stalin “laughed and joked” and even introduced Churchill to his
daughter Svetlana. Churchill left the meeting with “a new confidence in Stalin.”
About the meeting, Churchill later said, “I was taken into the family, we ended as
friends.” Churchill also said, “Stalin was a man with whom I could do business.”
In the words of Professor Reynolds, the bruiser had become a charmer, a “Mister
Nice Guy” (SMS, video). When Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, was little,
Stalin used to carry her in his arms, give her loud kisses and call her pet names
like “little sparrow” and “little fly.” (Rancour-Leferriere, 1988, 58). Whether
Stalin’s shows of affection and friendship were sincere (as they probably were in
the case of his daughter) or a mere sham is a matter for speculation.
Bullock also believes that Hitler was worse. He argues that what sets Hitler
apart was the Holocaust. Nothing done by Stalin – not the purges, the show trials, the
Gulags, the deportations – matched Hitler’s program to exterminate the Jews. For
Bullock, that placed Hitler in a different category. Bullock writes: “The
inhumanity and excesses of the Stalinist repression were as unique in different ways,
as those of the Nazis, but they did not cancel out the uniqueness of the Holocaust”
(Bullock, 974). Bullock is correct if in fact the Holocaust was a unique event. But was it?
Before answering that question, anti-Semitism must first be discussed. The
Holocaust did not occur in a vacuum; something drove it and that was Nazi antiSemitism. Was the anti-Semitism of Adolf Hitler unique? The historical evidence
suggests that it was not.
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When Hitler took power in 1933, anti-Semitism was part of mainstream
European thought. In fact, it was pervasive (Hildebrandt, 2009, 886). Hitler did not it.
Jews were despised. In no country were they fully trusted or accepted. Civil
emancipation by Napoleon did not translate into greater tolerance; the nineteenth
century marked the emergence of a virulent form of racial anti-Semitism (Steiman,
1998, 114, 117-142). Jews were labeled and portrayed as radicals, plutocrats,
cosmopolitans and subversives (Bing, online). French socialist Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon described Jews as “fraudulent” and “parasitic” (Lewis, 1986, 111).
Their patriotism was considered a sham and their loyalty questioned. Historian
Bernard Lewis writes that Jews were depicted as aliens to the nation (Lewis, 1986, 68).
In 1847 Otto von Bismarck, as a member of the Landtag (and years before he became
chancellor of Germany), expressed the belief that Jews should not have access of all
public offices since it would be incompatible with the Christian character of the state
(Katz, 1973, 198). In 1875 in Hungary a parliamentary deputy began demanding the
expulsion of Jews from the country (Ettinger, 1976, 876). From September 1879 in
Germany the Christian Social Workers’ Party concentrated its efforts on anti-Jewish
agitation (Ettinger, 1976, 875). (Later on Adolf Hitler would characterize the CSWP’s
anti-Semitism as only “half-hearted” (Hitler, 1998, 120)). In 1891 in France a deputy
proposed that Jews be expelled from the country; thirty-two deputies supported him
(Ettinger, 1976, 878). In 1893, sixteen deputies were elected to the Reichstag on a
specifically anti-Semitic platform (Laqueur, 2001, 29). In 1894 in France, as part of a
campaign to discredit the loyalty of Jews, a French-Jewish military officer Alfred
Dreyfus was found guilty of treason on fabricated evidence (Lewis, 1986, 69);this was
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followed by anti-Semitic demonstrations and riots in nearly seventy towns and cities
(Marrus, 1987, 60). Historian Michael Marrus writes, “Anti-Semitism was deeper and
more pervasive than a mere passing fever” (Marrus, 1987, xxvii). The nineteenth
century German philosopher Eugen Duhring attributed the cause of “Jewish depravity”
to “Jewish blood” (Fischer, 1998, 103). In 1910 the English social philosopher and
historian Houston Stewart Chamberlain, son-in-law of the German composer
Richard Wagner, warned that the Jews, through “the law of blood,” could achieve
mastery of Europe:
Consider with what mastery they use the law of blood to
extend their power; the principal stem remains spotless,
not a drop of strange blood comes in; as it stands in the
Thora, “A bastard shall not enter into the congregation of
the Lord; even to his tenth generation shall he not enter
into the congregation of the Lord.” (Deuteronomy, xxiii, 2);
in the meantime, however, thousands of side branches
are cut off and employed to infect the Indo-Europeans
with Jewish blood. If that were to go on for a few
centuries, there would be in Europe only one single
people of pure race, that of the Jews, all the rest would be
a herd of pseudo-Hebraic mestizos, a people beyond all
doubt degenerate physically, mentally and morally.
(Chamberlain, 1910, 331)
The theme of the Jews as a separate race posing a threat to the state is also
contained in the writings of the German philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler.
Discussing the racial characteristics of the Jewish people, Spengler in 1926 wrote:
It is stated that even today Jews can amongst
themselves distinguish very different races at the first
glance, and that in the ghettos of eastern Europe the
“tribes” (in the Old Testament sense) are clearly
recognized. But none of this constitutes a different
nation. According to von Erckert, the West European
Jew-type is universally distributed within the
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non-Jewish Caucasian peoples, whereas according to
Weissenberg it does not occur at all amongst the longheaded Jews of southern Arabia, where Sabaen
tomb-sculptures show a human type that might also
claim to be Roman or Germanic and is the ancestor of
these Jews who were converted by missionary effort at
least by the birth of Christ. (Spengler, v. 2, 1926, 175-176)
Spengler goes on to discuss the historical relationship of minority groups to the
state and implied that it is the duty of the state to suppress these minority groups
if they pose a threat to the identity of the state:
If Christians lived in the Islamic State, Nestorians in the
Persian, Jews in the Byzantine, they did not and could
not as unbelievers belong to it, and consequently were
thrown back upon their own jurisdictions. If by reason of
their numbers or their missionary spirit they became a
threat to the continuance of the identity of the state and
creed-community, persecution became a national duty.
(Spengler, v. 2, 1926, 177-178)
Self-preservation, not pluralism nor tolerance, is the message conveyed. The
minority group is the enemy and poses a direct threat to the community by virtue
of their difference which is defined by race. Persecution is not only an option. It is
a duty.
Hitler was not a political philosopher, nor did he have much formal
education. But he was a voracious reader with a strong interest in history.
According to historian Brigitte Hamann, as a young man in Vienna Hitler got his
information from books at the public library, booklets published by political
parties and associations, and newspapers (Hamann, 1999, 200-201). Years later,
after becoming Fuhrer, he would talk about topics he remembered from his youth.
His secretary, Christa Schroeder, reported that Hitler’s memory “was in perfect
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order, a bona fide mental chest of drawers from which he knew how to profit
optimally.” (Hamann, 1999, 201).
Further evidence of cultural influences which shaped Hitler’s thinking can
be found in Mein Kampf, published in 1925. In this book, written while in prison,
Hitler spelled out his political and racial agenda. From 1905 to 1913, ages 16 to 23,
Hitler had lived in Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the time
Vienna, with a population of two million people, was the sixth largest city in the
world (Hamann, 1999, 277). Circulating around Vienna was a whole range of antiSemitic and racial theories. Although crudely expressed and devoid of scientific
value, these gained traction and attracted a large public following, that even
included some Jews such as Otto Weiniger and Arthur Trebitisch (Hamann, 1999,
227-235). Talk of a “master race” and “inferior races” was everywhere. Everything
was explained by way of race (Hamann, 1999, 204). One theory asserted that Jews
were dangerous because they were spoiling the Aryan “noble race” through
mixed marriages (Hamann, 1999, 208). Another purported that they were weak
and not able to live independently, thus representing a parasitic life form, and
that “every people has the right to vigorously fight the willful and deliberate
deterioration of its race” (Hamann, 1999, 223)” Another insisted that
anthropologically the Jews were related to “Mongols” and “Negroes”:
The curly hair points to the Negro, and the complete
Chinese and Malaysian shapes of their skulls, which one
so often encounters among the Jews – who then also
invariably have a yellowish complexion – point to partly
Mongolian blood 2 (Hamann, 1999, 228-229)

2

This theory clearly contradicted Chamberlain’s notion of a pure Jewish race.
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Another theory declared that:
it is the duty of the Nordic man, who has ripened under
a colder sky, to eliminate the parasitic races just as one
simply has to eliminate dangerous poisonous snakes
and wild beasts of prey. (Hamann, 1999, 241-242)
Another theory, and this one is especially noteworthy in view of what subsequently
transpired, warned that:
the Jews were fighting along with the Socialists, the
Catholics, the Jesuits, and the Freemasons to ruin the
Aryans and seize power. Thus the German people are in
danger of perishing if it does not defend itself. It also
needs a leader who is “born and sent by God. Yet to
serve the will of such a Fuhrer means submitting
oneself to the total will of the entire German people and
serving that will, which has remained mute so far and
become loud and clear only through this leader.”
(Hamann, 1999, 232)
There is no doubt that during the seven years that Hitler lived in Vienna he was
exposed to these and similar ideas. This was witnessed by people who knew him.
Of course, one could argue that exposure alone would not necessarily
transform someone into a fanatical, race-baiting anti-Semite. But the mayor of
Vienna, Karl Lueger (as well as many members of the Vienna city council), was a
notorious anti-Semite and provided Hitler, a highly impressionable person who
fancied himself an artist, with a political role model. It was Lueger who said that
anti-Semitism would “perish, but not until the last Jew has perished”(Hamann,
1999, 286, 290). A Lueger associate Josef Gregori stated in the Reichsrat, “I
would very much like to see all Jews ground into artificial fertilizer … I would like
that very much” and “If you go and hang 3,000 stock exchange Jews today, wheat
will be cheaper tomorrow. Do that, it’s the only solution to the bread issue”
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(Hamann, 1999, 287). An anti-Semitic pamphlet speculated what the provinces of
the the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be like in 1920 had Vienna being renamed
Luegerville and the city was “Jew-free” because the Christians had driven the
“flatfeet,” “crooked-noses,” and “Yiddish gabbers” to Budapest by means of a
total economic embargo (Hamann, 1999, 294).
Hitler incorporated these ideas and others into Mein Kampf. The struggle
against the Jews would be a crusade. Hitler wrote, “By defending myself against
the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord” (Hitler, 1998, 65).
The idea of man as heroic avenger had already been rooted in the writings
of German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer writes:
It is a rare, very significant, and even sublime trait of
character through which the individual sacrifices
himself by striving to make himself the arm of eternal
justice, of the true nature of which he is yet ignorant.
(Schopenhauer, v.1, 1968, 463-464)
To take on a cause was not only heroic, it was magnificent.
Regarding the need to maintain and protect the purity of blood Hitler wrote,
“There is only one holiest human right, and this right is at the same time the
holiest obligation, to wit: to see to it that the blood is preserved pure and, by
preserving the best humanity, to create the possibility of a nobler development of
these beings” (Hitler, 1998, 402). The connection between this statement and the
theories of race that were being spread in Vienna at the time Hitler lived there is
obvious. (The parallel between this notion of creating a superior race of people
and the stated Communist aim to create the new “Soviet Man” is striking. The
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particular ideals to be cultivated might have been different. The murderous
ruthlessness with which it was pursued was not.)
On the need for Germans to acquire their own special land, Hitler wrote,
“We Nationalist Socialists must hold unflinchingly to our aim in foreign policy,
namely, to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are
entitled on this earth” (Hitler, 1998, 652). This idea was drawn from the theories
propounded by the Austrian Pan-German movement, which was also vehemently
anti-Semitic. Its leader, Georg Schonerer, wrote, “We consider anyone a renegade
of his people who knowingly supports the Jews and their agents and comrades”
(Hamann, 1999, 243). Schonerer also warned of the need to prepare for the
ensuing war between Germans and Jews: “If we don’t expel the Jews, we
Germans will be expelled” (Hamann, 1999, 243). (Schonerer had people refer to
him as the sole and absolute “Fuhrer,” a practice which Hitler later adopted.)
(Hamann, 1999, 244, 252).
Hitler wrote Mein Kampf to warn people of the supposed Jewish threat. He
wrote, “For once this book has become the common property of a people, the
Jewish menace may be considered as broken” (Hitler, 1998, 308). The connection
between Hitler’s political agenda and the anti-Semitic ideas that were circulating
in Vienna is self-evident. Adopting the swastika as a symbol had first been an
idea inspired by Guido von List; the idea of a “Thousand-Year Reich” was a
concept based on the theories of Hanns Horbiger, who taught that the course of
world history always runs in 2,100 year-long cycles (Hamann, 1999, 209-215, 225226). Hitler was not an original thinker, but he knew who to turn to for his ideas.
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That Hitler chose to exploit the prevailing anti-Semitism for his own purposes
was an act of demagoguery, but given the cultural milieu in which he lived and
the intensity, scope, and depth of anti-Semitic feeling at the time, this should not
be surprising. He also very much believed in it.
German anti-Semites were not alone in their perturbations over the Jews.
Lenin was distressed by them too. While Lenin did not advocate an official
policy of persecution or outright extermination, he believed that Jewish national
aspirations were inconsistent with the goals of the proletarian revolution, and
preferred that Jews not push the matter and make it an issue. Although he was
willing to allow the Poles and other national groups autonomy within the larger
Soviet state, he was not willing to extend such a privilege to the Jews, who Lenin
considered a caste. For Lenin, the solution of the Jewish problem was
emancipation and assimilation (Wolfe, 1964, 579). Stalin agreed, and went even
further by claiming that Jews were already vanishing. In 1917 he wrote, “In brief,
the Jewish nation is coming to end, and therefore there is nobody to demand
national autonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated” (Stalin, National Question,
1942, 40).
Whether Stalin was anti-Semitic is a matter for conjecture. Bullock asserts
that he was and after 1948 used Zionism as pretext to initiate an anti-Semitic
campaign, which was centered on the so-called Doctors’ Plot (Bullock, 1991, 956957). Apparently Stalin believed that certain Jewish organizations inside the
Soviet Union with ties to the United States were being used as fronts by Jews
with pro-Israel and pro-Zionist leanings who thus posed a threat to the security of
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the USSR. (His own use of Communist parties around the world must have
naturally inclined him to this.) Historians Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov
write:
With the founding of the state of Israel and outbreaks
throughout the Soviet Union of what Stalin perceived to
be dangerous pro-Israel, Zionist fervor in the Soviet
Jewish population, it was alleged that Jews could not be
trusted to be loyal to the USSR, and constituted a
potential fifth column in case of a war with the United
States. (Brent and Naumov, 2003, 94).
Stalin was not alone in his preoccupation with Jewish subversion. In the United
States both the House of Representatives and the Senate had in 1941 conducted
hearings on allegations of Communist infiltration in the movie industry and the
government (HCUA, 1947, passim; SPSI, 1953, passim). Many of those
investigated were Jews. Ironically, while Jews in the Soviet Union were being
accused of anti-Soviet leanings, Jewish-Americans in the US were accused of
fronting for the Soviet Union.
However, other evidence suggests that the subject of Stalin and
anti-Semitism is far more complex. Both Stalin’s daughter-in-law and his
daughter Svetlana’s first husband were Jewish, as was one of his closest
associates, Lazar Kaganovich. Stalin had three grandchildren who were half
Jewish. (In 1999, one of his grandchildren, Yevgeny Djugashvili, sued a Russian
newspaper for libel over a report that his grandfather had ordered killings of
Soviet citizens.) (Faulconbridge, 8/31/09). Under Stalin, no laws or regulations
were enacted specifically targeting Jews. On January 12, 1931, in a reply to an
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inquiry from the Jewish News Agency, Stalin issued a statement categorically
denouncing anti-Semitism:
National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the
misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of
cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial
chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of
cannibalism.
Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a
lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the
working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous
for the working people as being a false path that leads
them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence
Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be
irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.
In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the
utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply
hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active
anti-semites are liable to the death penalty. (Stalin,
Works, v.13, 30).
Article 123 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, introduced under Stalin (Stalin,
Selected Writings, 1942, 379-405), prohibited discrimination based on nationality
or race:
Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective
of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic,
state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible
law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or,
conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect
privileges for, citizens on account of their race or
nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national
exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by
law.
Some of Stalin’s highest ranking security officials were Jewish. They included
Genrikh Yagoda, chief of Soviet Secret Police, Matvei Berman, Naftaly
Frenkel,Leonid Reichman, and Lev Inzhir (Plocker, 11/28/13). Stalin would also
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later support the creation of the state of Israel (Auster, 10/9/03; Bullock, 1991,
957).
As to whether Stalin privately was anti-Semitic, evidence suggests that in
his youth he was (Radzinsky, 1996, 25-27). He also apparently made anti-Semitic
statements as an adult. The evidence is anecdotal. Referring to a preponderance
of Jews in the Menshevik faction at the London Congress of 1907, Stalin wrote:
Apropos of that, one of the Bolsheviks jestingly
remarked (I think it was Comrade Alexinsky) that the
Mensheviks were a Jewish faction while the Bolsheviks
were truly Russian, and hence it would not be amiss for
us Bolsheviks to instigate a Pogrom in the Party.
(Trotsky, 1967, 152)
The Social Revolutionary Karganov claimed that in 1911, Stalin, in the course of
an argument, resorted “to coarse Georgian expressions against the Jews”
(Trotsky, 1967, 172). According to Trotsky, Stalin’s attitude to the appearance of
“caricatures and doggerels of anti-Semitic character in the Party press,” was one
of “friendly neutrality” (Trotsky, 1967, 399). The so-called Doctors’ Plot in the
early 1950s which targeted a preponderance of Jews is also cited as evidence of
Stalin’s anti-Semitic leanings, but here too the question of Stalin’s actual
motivations is unclear. Most of the victims had Jewish-sounding surnames, but
the campaign was never officially designated as being aimed at Jewish citizens.
Further, nobody knows for certain what was driving Stalin to act. Historian
Robert Service writes:
Whether Stalin really intended the universal deportation
of Jews in the early 1950s remains unknown, though
this is widely treated as a fact; and no conclusive proof
has come to light. (Service, 2005, 577).
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(Paradoxically, while the loyalty of Jews to the Soviet Union was being
questioned by Stalin, in the United States two American Jews, Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg, were convicted and executed for conspiring to commit espionage for
the Soviet Union (Radosh and Milton, 1983, passim)). According to historians Roy
and Zhores Medvedev, “Stalin’s anti-Semitism was fundamentally ‘political,’
although this can be no more than a supposition” (Medvedev, 2004, 275). Whether
the evidence, all of which is based on innuendo, is sufficient to establish that
Stalin was an anti-Semite is debatable.
It could be argued that the policy of assimilation as advocated by Lenin
and Stalin was evidence of anti-Semitic intent. For Jews assimilation would mean
losing their cultural identity. But Stalin was not interested in preserving or
promoting ethnic diversity; in fact the opposite: his goal was the creation of a
dictatorship of the proletariat in which ethnic and national differences would be
reduced and ameliorated if not altogether eliminated. Addressing the subject of
national self-determination, Stalin wrote:
In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination,
the aims of the Social-Democrats is to put an end to the
policy of national oppression, to render it impossible,
and thereby to remove the grounds of hostility between
nations, to take the edge off that hostility and reduce it
to a minimum (Stalin, National Question, 1942, 23)
According to Article 1, Chapter 1, clause 1 of the Russian Constitution of 1918,
The Russian Soviet Republic was officially organized on the basis of a free union
of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics. The operative word is
“soviet.” It was a soviet state in which all power was vested in the soviets
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(councils). Nationalist aspirations had no place in the Stalinist scheme, and were
deemed a serious obstacle to the achievement of Bolshevik objectives. This is
not to suggest that Stalin disavowed the concept of nations as a legitimate form
of social organization. But he differentiated between what he termed “bourgeois
nations” that were imperialistic and driven by capitalism, and “socialist nations”
in which capitalism has been eliminated, “exempt from irreconcilable class
contradictions that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are far more
representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation” (Stalin, Works.
v.11, 354-356). As for the national aspirations of the Jews, which were expressed
through the Jewish Bund – first, Stalin, like Lenin, did not believe that the Jews
were a nation and therefore considered their demands for national autonomy a
sham, and second, he believed, again like Lenin, that such aspirations,
groundless or not, posed a threat to the working class movement. Stalin wrote:
“The disorganization of the working-class movement, the demoralization of the
ranks of Social-Democracy – that is where the federalism of the Bund is leading”
(Stalin, National Question, 1942, 51). Stalin also warned of the need for the Party
to deal with this problem. Whether Stalin’s opposition to the Jewish Bund was
anti-Semitic or not ideological is debatable, but what is certain is that any group
that demonstrated a tendency to deviate away from the party line on the question
of nationalities was bound to invite Stalin’s ire.
Hitler was not the originator of modern anti-Semitism. He was also not the
first political figure to target an entire people for destruction. It is true that in
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terms of its scope the Holocaust is remarkable. It continued over a period of
years and affected millions of people in many countries. The Lodz Ghetto,
the Warsaw Ghetto, Kristallnacht, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, and Auschwitz attest
to its sheer magnitude and horror (Adelson and Lapides, 1989, passim;
Dobroszycki, 1984, passim; Mazor, 1993, passim; Rotem, 1994, passim; Burleigh,
2000, 325-334, 587-589, 775-776; Hoess, 1959, passim; Levi, 2006, passim;
Steinbacher, 2005, passim). Yet the Holocaust was neither a unique historical
occurrence, nor was it a concept that originated with Hitler.
Throughout history, whole populations have been targeted for destruction.
In the United States the Native American population was virtually wiped out, and
while General Philip Sheridan did not exactly say “The only good Indian is a dead
Indian,” his intention was nonetheless clear (Oster, 2004, 13-15, 47, 307-309;
Brown, 2001, 1-12). In southern Africa the British forcibly subjugated the Zulus,
and then did the same to the Afrikaners, putting many in concentration camps
(Welsh, 1999, 262-267, 334-335). In the Congo, Belgian king Leopold II treated the
region as his personal fiefdom, resulting in the annihilation of whole populations
(Hochschild, 1998, passim). During World War One the Ottoman Turks
slaughtered Armenians in a genocidal campaign (Akcam, 2006, passim; Dadrian,
1995, passim). Language alluding to extermination can even be found in the Bible.
The following are excerpts from the Book of Genesis: “So the Lord said, ‘I will
wipe from the face of the earth the human race I have created—and with them the
animals, the birds and the creatures that move along the ground—for I regret that
I have made them.’” (The Holy Bible, Genesis 6:7) The Lord then reiterates his
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intentions: “So God said to Noah, ‘I am going to put an end to all people, for the
earth is filled with violence because of them. I am surely going to destroy both
them and the earth’” (The Holy Bible, Genesis 6:13). (God’s genocidal intent
would later be restricted to such people as the Amalekites.) Hitler was not acting
in a cultural vacuum.
Neither was Stalin. He too was influenced by the social and historical
forces of his time – the emergence of Marxism, the Revolution of 1905, the First
World War, the rise of Lenin, Trotsky and the Bolshevik Party, and the February
and October 1917 revolutions (Bullock, 1971, passim; Wolfe, 1964, passim). Nor
did concepts such as one-party rule, political terror, and political fanaticism
originate with him. From the September 1, 1918 edition of the Bolshevik
newspaper, Krasnaya Gazeta:
We will turn our hearts into steel, which we will temper
in the fire of suffering and the blood of fighters for
freedom. We will make our hearts cruel, hard, and
immovable, so that no mercy will enter them, and so that
they will not quiver at the sight of a sea of enemy blood.
We will let loose the floodgates of that sea. Without
mercy, without sparing, we will kill our enemies in
scores of hundreds. Let them be thousands; let them
drown themselves in their own blood. For the blood of
Lenin and Uritsky, Zinovief and Volodarski, let there be
floods of the blood of the bourgeois – more blood, as
much as possible (World Future Fund, online)
In 1906 Lenin wrote:
We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if
we concealed from the masses the necessity of a
desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the
immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.
(World Future Fund, online)
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Marxist ideology held that in a socialist state aggressive leadership was both
necessary and inevitable. In the Communist Manifesto Marx writes, “The
proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own
bourgeoisie” (Marx, 1998, 49).” Marx’s ominous words would later be put into
action by Stalin.
Yet, unlike Hitler, who had gained power through legal means before
declaring himself Fuhrer and therefore could assert at least a partial claim to
political legitimacy, Stalin’s right to rule was a far less settled matter. The
Communist Party had gained power through a coup and its effectiveness as a
political force depended not on mass support but on maintaining a rigid
organizational cohesiveness from the top down, and imposing and enforcing
ideological discipline. Those in control set the party line and brooked no
opposition. Such opposition was perceived as a direct threat to those in power. In
the Soviet Union the man who controlled the party and set the party line
was Joseph Stalin. His word was law. To oppose him was tantamount to inviting
physical annihilation (Khrushchev, 1970, 564). This was the case because Stalin
controlled the party apparatus that included the security police, whose services
he employed to ensure compliance with party directives.
Although Article 127 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution required that an arrest
be made pursuant to a court order, a person could be “detained” without the
sanction of the court or prosecutor, that is, solely on the discretion of the police,
in “all cases where public order and security is threatened.” The Soviet judicial
system also permitted detentions pursuant to an open warrant. Often legal
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formalities were dispensed with. As a result, there were many arrests and prisons
quickly became overcrowded, resulting in conditions that were deplorable and
inhumane. For instance, in some Siberian towns, when the overflow was too great,
prisoners were herded into pits dug in the ground and roofed over. In Kharkov in
1937 a prison built for around 800 held around 12,000. In Novosibirsk, about 270
men were crammed into a forty-square-meter cell (Conquest, The Great Terror,
1990, 264).
Stalin himself admitted that the situation got out of hand, especially in the
countryside during the initial period of collectivization. He claimed that the police
targeted the wrong people:
As long as the offensive was directed against the kulaks
in a united front with the middle peasant, all went well.
But when certain of our comrades, intoxicated by
success, began imperceptibly to slip from the path of
offensive against the kulak to the path of fighting the
middle peasant; when, in the pursuit of high
percentages of collectivization, they began to employ
coercion against the middle peasant, depriving him, of
the franchise, “dekulakizing” and expropriating him, the
offensive began to assume distorted form, the united
front with the middle peasant began to be undermined,
and, naturally, the kulak received the opportunity to try
to get on his feet again. (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 175-176)
As far as Stalin was concerned, the policy was sound; only its implementation
was flawed. Nevertheless its consequences were devastating, especially in the
Ukraine, where the resulting chaos in the countryside led to a famine that
reportedly killed millions of people (CUF, 1987, passim).
Now, why did Stalin launch an “offensive” against the kulaks? Here is his
explanation: “We are conducting an offensive against the capitalist elements in
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the countryside in alliance with the middle peasants, for only such an offensive
can bring us victory” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 185). Stalin was a Marxist who
understood social relations in terms of class struggle, not compromise or
building consensus. For him, to target a class or an ethnic group for punitive
action was not a capricious act; it was part of a larger historical process.
Historian Robert Payne writes, “In his struggle for power Stalin showed that he
would employ any weapon, even the most unscrupulous, in order to achieve his
aims” (Payne, 1965, 318). Payne is correct. Payne also writes, “Stalin, by
introducing the cult of the dead Lenin, was reinforcing his own role as the deified
successor” (Payne, 1965, 345). Payne again is correct. Stalin saw himself as a
disciple of Lenin. Indeed he revered Lenin. In a eulogy published in 1924 in
commemoration of Lenin’s career and contributions to the cause of revolution,
Stalin said, “Lenin was born for revolution. He was, in truth, the genius of
revolutionary outbreaks and the greatest master of the art of revolutionary
leadership” (Stalin, Works, v.6, 63).That Stalin, a Communist, was driven by a
religious-like fervor is confirmed by biographer Isaiah Deutscher who
writes, “In his own mind he saw himself not as a modern Pharoah but as a new
Moses leading the chosen nation in the desert” (Deutscher, 1949, 326-327).
As Lenin’s disciple, Stalin wanted to achieve victory of the working class,
and to achieve victory meant acting in accordance with the exhortations of his
most venerated mentor. It was Lenin, supreme leader of the revolution, the
man who successfully led the Bolsheviks to victory, the man most revered by
Stalin, the man who symbolized everything that Stalin valued and who gave
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meaning to Stalin’s life, who ordered that the kulaks be exterminated. It was not
Stalin’s idea. In August 1918 Lenin, employing highly inflammatory language,
wrote:
The kulaks are the most brutal, callous and savage
exploiters ….
These bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want
suffered by the people in the war; they have raked in
thousands and hundreds of thousands of rubles by
screwing up the prices of grain and other products.
These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the
peasants who have been ruined by the war, at the
expense of the hungry workers. These leeches sucked
the blood of the toilers and grew richer as the workers in
the cities and factories starved. These vampires have
been gathering and are gathering the landed estates into
their hands; they keep on enslaving the poor peasants.
Ruthless war must be waged on these kulaks! Death to
them! Hatred and contempt for the parties which defend
them – the Right Socialist Revolutionaries, the
Mensheviks and the present-day Left Social
Revolutionaries! The workers must crush with an iron
hand the revolts of the kulaks who are forming an
alliance with foreign capitalists against the toilers of
their own country. (Lenin, Selected Works, v.8, 130-131)
Lenin called for aggressive action against the kulaks. His faithful follower, Stalin,
quoting Lenin verbatim and employing the exact same language would later
answer the call (Stalin, Leninism, Selected Writings, 191). According to Lenin, of
the fifteen million peasant households in Russia, about two million were kulak,
that is, rich peasants. Thus, going after them would be a big job. Hence, when
Stalin ordered the collectivization of the farms, it took on aspects of a military
operation. Historian Robert Conquest writes, “In the early 1930s, the
collectivization campaign had turned Ukraine, more than anywhere else, into a
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battlefield between the Party and the population, and Party solidarity was the
decisive criterion” (Conquest, 1968, 229). Anyone who opposed the party was
considered a traitor. It was warfare, class warfare, the proletariat versus the
bourgeoisie. Whether Stalin had cause to conduct this campaign is debatable;
whether he deserves to be labeled a monster is debatable too; that he believed
that he was doing what was right is beyond doubt.
Perhaps the most notorious example of Stalin’s unbridled use of power
occurred during the so-called great purge of 1936-1939. In 1934, Serge Kirov, the
head of the Communist organization in Leningrad and a potential rival to Stalin
was murdered (Conquest, 1989, 7-9). The exact circumstances surrounding the
murder were never established. Trotsky believed that Kirov’s death was a political
assassination and that Stalin was responsible (Conquest, 1989, 71). Nevertheless,
Stalin used Kirov’s murder as a pretext for launching a purge against “terrorists”
and “Troskyites” and in effect to “clean house” and further consolidate his power.
This meant having to “exterminate” the communist opposition (Rogovin, 1998,
143). Bolsheviks who had opposed Stalin in the past were arrested, tried,
convicted; the NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del – the People’s
Commissariat for Internal Affairs, i.e., Stalin’s security organization) was directed
to carry out death sentences (Conquest, 1989, 37). At least one million persons
died as a result of the excesses perpetrated by Stalin and his security police.
Even the military did not escape. In 1937, Stalin personally accused six major
political leaders, including Leon Trotsky (who was in exile), and seven senior
military generals of being part of “a military-political conspiracy against the
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Soviet regime, instigated and financed by the German fascists” and directly
accused ten of them of being German spies (Rogovin, 1998, 432-433). Trotsky
condemned the accusations as “absurd” and “shameful,” and the
subsequent executions of the accused as “murder” (Rogovin, 1998, 445).
According to Khrushchev, such accusations were trumped up. Many others spent
ten to fifteen years in prison for nothing (Khrushchev, 1970, 348).
At times, Stalinist rhetoric devolved into sheer hysteria. During the third
Moscow show trial against Nikolai Bukharin (“the favorite of the party”) and the
"bloc of Rightists and Trotskyites," Soviet prosecutor and Stalin mouthpiece
Andrei Vyshinsky warned that “the Trotskyite hypocrites must be liquidated.” He
called the defendants “underground spies,” and “a fifth column, a Ku Klux Klan.”
Vyshinsky further declared that “the mask of treason has been torn from their
faces” and that “the masses demand only one thing – to stamp out this accursed
vermin” (MST, video). These inflammatory words were not mere hyperbole or
theatrics; they were followed by action. To be accused of treason meant death.
Estimates of the number of people who died during the great purge vary.
According to declassified Soviet archives, during 1937 and 1938 the police
detained 1,548,366 people, of whom 681,692 were shot (Pipes, 2003, 67).
Robert Conquest believes that the number of persons who died in the camps
totaled about 3 million (Conquest, 1990, 485). Historian Michael Ellman claims
that the number of deaths for those years ranged from 950,000 to 1.2 million
(Ellman, 2002, 1162). Stalin personally ordered the execution of approximately
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40,000 persons, 90 percent of whom were confirmed to have been shot (Ellman,
2007, 676).
The statistics attest to the brutal nature of the Stalin regime. Yet, before
deciding whether to close the book on Stalin and conclude that he was a fiend,
we must first consider certain additional facts. First, Lenin warned that the Soviet
republic was surrounded by enemies, both external and internal. This was not an
idea that originated with Stalin. Second, when Lenin issued that warning, in 1918,
it was not mere hyperbole: the threat was real; the Soviet regime was actually
under attack, by enemies both domestic and foreign. Stalin was alive at the time.
Third, as already shown, Lenin had warned of the threat to party unity posed by
left and right deviationists and Mensheviks. Party factionalism was an idea not
fabricated by Stalin. Fourth, Lenin ordered that the Soviet Union defend itself
against spies. The May 31, 1919 edition of Pravda published this directive signed
by Lenin: “Death to spies! …. All class conscious workers and peasants must
rise up in defense of the Soviet power and must fight the spies and Whiteguard
traitors.” (The White Guards were fighters who opposed the Bolsheviks). This
was Lenin’s directive, not Stalin’s. Fifth, to prevent the party from becoming
corrupted by petty-bourgeois and petty-bourgeois-anarchist elements, Lenin
demanded that the party be purged. Lenin also ordered that it “be purged of
rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering Communists, and of Mensheviks
who have repainted their ‘façade’ but who have remained Mensheviks at heart.”
The need to purge the party, to keep it ideologically pure, was thus also an idea
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not originated by Stalin. Sixth, on September 24, 1927, Leon Trotsky made his socalled Clemenceau statement in which he said that in the event of an emergency
he would strive to achieve a change in government. Trotsky’s statement
concluded with these words:
If I were threatened by an enemy and my eyes were
blindfolded or my hand tied to my shoulder, I would say
that the chief danger was – not the enemy, but the
handicaps restricting my movements. It is a lie that the
danger or even war itself excludes the self-acting of the
party, which discusses and decides all questions and
which directs and checks all its organs from top to
bottom. If as a result of our mistakes the enemy did
appear within 80 kilometers of Moscow, then the selfaction of the party would have to be ten times greater
than under any other conditions. But the task right now
is not to permit such a situation, but to prevent it. This
can be realized only by a living party, self-acting and
completely alive. The first thing that follows from this is
that there must be a change in the party régime (Trotsky,
1927, 24-26)
This statement gave Stalin a credible pretext to treat Trotsky and others as
traitors. These facts in no way mitigate the havoc, hardship and suffering caused
by the purge, or of Stalin’s responsibility as chief perpetrator, but are presented
to place Stalin’s actions in an historical context.
But if Stalin seems cold-blooded, he was operating in a political culture
which placed no value on mercy. To show mercy was ideologically incorrect. It
meant giving the enemies of the people a chance, and in class warfare, the
“final struggle” as Lenin expressed it, that was unthinkable. Lenin framed the
nature of the struggle in the starkest language:
Doubt is out of the question. The kulaks are rabid foes
of the Soviet government. Either the kulaks massacre
vast numbers of workers or the workers ruthlessly
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suppress the uprisings of the predatory kulak minority
of the people against the government of the toilers.
There can be no middle course. Peace is out of the
question; even if they quarreled, the kulak can easily
come to terms with the landlord, the tsar and the priest,
but with the working class, never. (Lenin, Selected
Works, 28).
To Lenin, concepts such as liberty and the rights of man were a bourgeois sham,
ridiculed by Marx himself (Lenin, 1951, 232). Historian Waldemar Gurian writes,
“As its history and distinctive character prove, the Bolshevik state is an
absolutist state guided solely by considerations of political expediency, and its
determination to maintain its authority” (Gurian, 1932, 115). Expediency, not
morality, driven by historical imperatives was the motivating principle behind
Bolshevik actions, and Stalin, as a Bolshevik and follower of Lenin, acted
accordingly.
Hitler too used coercive measures to settle political differences and
consolidate his power. There are three instances when he resorted to such a
tactic. The first was after the Reichstag fire incident. On Feb, 27, 1933 an
arsonist destroyed the Reichstag. Hitler used this as a pretext to warn Reich
President Paul von Hindenburg of a Communist takeover. At Hitler’s request, the
president signed the so-called Reichstag Fire Decree that suspended civil
liberties. Armed with this decree, Hitler went after his political enemies. Over
3,000 persons were arrested, including opposing Communists and Social
Democrats. With the left opposition under arrest and in disarray and
parliamentary government all but destroyed, a truncated Reichstag granted Hitler
the authority to rule by decree. Soon after, Hitler became dictator (FRFEA, online).
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The second episode occurred during an event subsequently known as
“The Nights of the Long Knives.” Beginning on June 30, 1934, over a two-day
period SS and Gestapo agents throughout Germany arrested and murdered, on
Hitler’s order, hundreds of people who Hitler perceived were obstacles to
achieving absolute power. These opponents included Hitler’s political rival for
party leadership Gregor Strasser, former Chancellor General Kurt Von Schleicher,
and Ernst Rohm, commander of the 3-million-man Sturm Abteilung or SA, the
Nazi Party’s private paramilitary army. The role of the SA was to intimidate and
crush political opponents. Under pressure to bring the SA under control or lose
the support of the Army, Hitler decided to eliminate Rohm, who had fought
alongside Hitler on the streets. The number of murdered in the purge is not
known, although it is estimated that it may have exceeded one-thousand.
Regarding Hitler’s role in the assassinations, historian Paul R. Maracin says: “In
this whole episode we see a mass murderer at work.” (TNLK, video).
Ten years later, Hitler again resorted to political terror, this time in the
aftermath of a failed assassination attempt against him by a group of army
officers who were plotting to stage a coup, known as “Operation Valkyrie” (Fest,
1975, 709). On July 20, 1944, during one of Hitler’s military conferences, one of
the conspirators, an army colonel, placed a bomb next to Hitler. The bomb
exploded, killing four, but Hitler survived with minimal injuries. The plot failed and
Hitler vowed retribution. In a speech broadcast to the German nation Hitler
warned, “This time we shall settle accounts with them in a manner to which we
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National Socialists are accustomed” (Shirer, 1960, 1069). Hitler ordered that the
perpetrators be expelled from the military, denied the right to court-martial, which
meant no due process, and face the People’s Court. Hitler demanded, “They must
hang at once without the slightest mercy” (TPKAH, video; Fest, 1975, 711).
In response to Hitler’s directive, the Gestapo arrested 7,000 persons,
including the families of the principal conspirators. Pursuant to Hitler’s order,
those implicated in the plot were put on trial before the People’s Court under the
jurisdiction of Nazi judge Roland Freisler, who Hitler called “our Vyshinsky” (Fest,
1975, 711). In the court, the accused were publicly excoriated and humiliated
before being sentenced to death. They were then executed with great cruelty.
This reportedly were filmed and shown to Hitler. The numbers believed executed
vary. Alan Bullock puts the figure at 200 (Bullock, 1971, 844). According to
William L. Shirer the total was 4,980. Hitler later said that at last he understood
why Stalin had purged the Red Army years before (Bullock, 1971, 846; Fest, 1994,
passim).
Stalin personally ordered mass deportations for reasons of security
(Ellman, 2002, 676). Stalin believed that “bourgeois influences” used nationalist
agitation as a cover in order to penetrate state organizations (Stalin, Leninism,
1942, 168-169). Nationalism, Stalin asserted, constituted a deviation from the
policy of the Communist Party on the national question, was contrary to the
teachings of Marx and Lenin, and therefore had to be fought (Stalin, National
Question, 1942, 203-216).
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Ethnic groups who had demonstrated anti-socialist tendencies, i.e.,
resistance to Bolshevik rule, and therefore deemed untrustworthy were subjected
to forced relocation. This program was accelerated during World War II as
German forces occupied vast areas of the western Soviet Union. It is estimated
that between 1941 and 1949 nearly 3.3 million persons were deported to Siberia
and the Central Asian republics (Boobbyer, 2000, 129-130). Ethnic groups
deported included Poles (in 1939–1941 and 1944–1945), Romanians (1941 and
1944–1953), Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians (1941 and 1945–1949), Volga
Germans (1941–1945), Ingrian Finns (1929–1931 and 1935–1939), Finnish people
in Karelia (1940–1941, 1944), Crimean Tatars, Crimean Greeks (1944), Caucasus
Greeks (1949-50), Kalmyks, Balkars, Karachays, Meskhetian Turks, Karapapaks,
Far East Koreans (1937), Chechens and Ingushs (1944) (Pohl, 1999, 9 ff, 139-141).
The number of deaths resulting from these forced transfers is unknown. One
estimate puts the figure at 500,000 deaths, another at 43 percent of the total
number resettled. These population shifts permanently altered the demographic
landscape of the Soviet Union. Thus by 1989, Latvians comprised only 52 percent
of their own country; in Estonia the figure was 62 percent. Later, after Stalin’s
death, Nikita Khrushchev condemned these forced deportations as a violation of
Leninist principles, but only when de-Stalinization was already in effect
(Khrushchev, 1970, 596).
Stalin was neither the first to order mass deportations nor the last. After
World War One, Turkey had expelled over 1,000,000 Greeks (de Zayas, 1989, 12).
In October 1945, Eduard Benes, Prime Minster of Czechoslovakia, declared his
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government’s intention to “rid” the state of its 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans (de
Zayas, 1989, 33). In the 1830s the United States had ordered the forced relocation
of thousands of Native Americans from Georgia and Florida to a region that later
became Oklahoma (Wilkins, 1986, passim). During World War Two the United
States ordered the forced internment of thousands of Japanese-Americans
(Weiss, 2011, passim). In the aftermath of the war, approximately 15,000,000
Germans were expelled from Poland and other regions of Eastern Europe
(de Zayas, 1989, 89). At the Potsdam Conference, the United States and Great
Britain, albeit with reservations, agreed to these postwar expulsions (de Zayas,
1989, 88). Churchill repeatedly approved in principle of this transfer (de Zayas,
1989, 92).
Hitler also ordered forced relocations of entire populations, but for different
reasons. Whereas Stalin sought to isolate those elements he believed posed a
threat to the security of the state, Hitler was driven by other concerns: the need
for more labor to continue the war effort and the need to make good on his vow to
rid the world of Jews. Estimates of the number of foreign civilian workers brought
into Germany during the war vary. According to one, 7.6 million foreign civilian
laborers and POWs were working in the German economy by mid-August 1944.
According to another, the figure was 10 to 15 million. Only a small fraction of the
foreign labor force worked voluntarily. Working conditions varied, depending on
the worker’s country of origin and ethnic background. For those at the bottom of
the Nazi racial hierarchy – Poles, Russians, and especially Jews – working
conditions were abominable. Thousands of Poles and Russians died of
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malnutrition, disease and violence; Jews were targeted for extermination
(Spoerer and Fleischhacker, 2002, 171).
Concomitant with the forced labor program was Hitler’s main program: the
plan to exterminate the Jews. Its implementation became known as the Holocaust.
In every country occupied by Germany, Jews, at the instigation of the German
occupiers, were rounded up by force and shipped to specially designated
locations where those deemed unfit to work were systematically murdered,
mostly by gassing. The transporting of the Jews was coordinated by a
department in the SS, IV B 4, headed by Adolf Eichmann (Eichmann, 1983, 64 ff).
Jews not transported were killed near their homes by special police units known
euphemistically as Einsatzgruppen, a German word meaning “one task units,” the
intended action being the chasing down, rounding up and killing of Jews
(Lipstadt, 1993, 9, 55, ff).
It is estimated that almost 6 million Jews were murdered during the
Holocaust (Eichmann, 1983, 110; Laqueur, 2001, 145; Schoenberner, 2004, 234).
The intensity of the suffering inflicted and the scope of the damage incurred are
incalculable. Throughout German-occupied Europe entire Jewish communities
were obliterated, and Jewish demographics in Europe permanently altered.
Jewish houses of worship were defiled and destroyed, Jewish artwork was looted,
Jewish property was expropriated, and Jews were kicked, beaten, robbed and
raped. Infants and pregnant women were murdered. Although other groups were
targeted by Hitler, it was the Jews alone who were earmarked euphemistically for
Sonderbehandlung, a German word meaning “special handling” and a Nazi code
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word for death (Eichmann, 1993, 108; Lipstadt, 1993, 154-155; van Pelt, 2002, 209,
217, 331, 332). In 1960 Adolf Eichmann confirmed that the term “Final Solution”
(Endlosung in German) meant the physical extermination of the Jews (Eichmann,
1983, 124).
In the process of comparing Hitler and Stalin, a parallel emerges. Both men
employed a specific nemesis, for Hitler it was “the Jew” and for Stalin, “anti-Soviet
element,” in particular Trotskyism. The importance of the nemesis as a tool for
maintaining power cannot be overstated. It provided the dictator with a convenient
rationale for imposing the harshest repressive measures. The nemesis was used
as a foil with which to deflect any potential opposition away from the dictator and
thereby bolster the regime’s credibility. Hence, for Stalin, the label “Trotskyite”
meant anyone who was threatening to split the party and act as a front for
counter-revolutionary elements, and for Hitler the term “Jew” meant a foreign
racial element whose presence was threatening the “natural order” of the world
(Stalin, Works, v.10, 192-193; Hitler, Table Talks, 237-238). In both cases, to
maintain the integrity of the regime the threat had to be eliminated, which meant
taking radical action.
Although the violence perpetrated by Hitler and Stalin was remarkable in
terms of its scope and sheer brutality, their actions were not without historical
precedent. From the eradication of Carthage in 146 B.C. (Bagnall, 2002, 72-75) to
the destruction of the Aztec Empire in the sixteenth century (Wood, 2000, 15-105),
there has been some propensity for human beings to perpetrate massive acts of
genocidal violence in the name of some idea, be it ideological, religious or
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commercial, or a combination of all three, and all of which predate Hitler and
Stalin.
However, what made Hitler and Stalin unique was the manner by which
their violence was organized. Terror was converted into an industrial process
which took rational thinking beings by the millions and transformed them into
nameless objects to be exploited and discarded. The process occurred in
concentration camps and gulags, factories where the dehumanization process
took place, operated by a bureaucracy whose power was absolute and lethal
(Conquest, The Great Terror, 1990, 264-282). In that respect, both Hitler and Stalin
can claim full credit both as innovators and enablers.
Yet, deciding which dictator was worse is an exercise that defies a
definitive answer. The record of brutality compiled by both regimes alone
militates against any meaningful attempt to compare the two. Hitler’s rhetoric and
public posturing was much more emotionally charged, more outlandish, and far
more hysterical in content than anything Stalin ever said, at least publicly, and so
on that basis alone Hitler comes off as being more vociferous. No matter how
egregious the Stalinist excesses, Stalin’s political posturing, compared to Hitler’s,
is flat. While Soviet rhetoric is crammed with all kinds of vitriolic against the
perceived enemies of the working class, there is no Soviet equivalent of a Nazi
policy statement declaring any group as biologically inferior. But such a
differentiation is dispositive in deciding which program was worse; rhetoric
notwithstanding, both pursued policies which yielded results that were
catastrophic. Which catastrophe was worse, the Nazi or the Soviet’s, is a
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question that cannot be answered with finality or objectivity. The subject is too
emotionally charged.
Both Hitler and Stalin pursued policies that led to war, destruction and
death on an unprecedented scale. However, historian Stephen Wheatcroft asserts
that “the Stalinist regime may have caused the premature death of more people
than Hitler’s regime,” but that it did not “purposefully” kill more people
(Wheatcroft, 1996, 1323). Wheatcroft’s assertion is debatable. Under Stalin people
were purposefully killed. In the totalitarian environment, it was either cooperation
or liquidation, there was no middle ground. Thus, those who did not cooperate
were targeted for punitive action, facilitated by a judicial system in which
summary executions were legal. The Stalinist purges support that conclusion.
Although capable of extraordinarily acts of brutality, Hitler’s political
violence, as differentiated from his racial violence, which was tied into a broader
policy of genocide, was incremental. Hitler did not have to deal with party
factionalism; he was the Nazi party. Once opposition was eliminated and his
power secured, Hitler continued pursuing his other programs. But for Stalin,
politics and policy were inseparable. Hence, the need for constant vigilance to
preserve his dominance in a one-party state became an ongoing preoccupation
which colored the nature of his entire regime. Everywhere and in everything
Stalin saw “enemies,” “two-facers” and “spies” (Khrushchev, 1970, 585). He
distrusted his own people; Hitler did not. For Hitler, the German people were his
racial comrades (Fest, 1975, 710). For Stalin, even group loyalty smacked of
nationalism and was reactionary and therefore a threat.
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Stalin believed that radical methods were justified. On that point he did not
mince words. Everything he did – the deportations, the purges, the show trials –
was motivated by the need to “break the resistance of the adversaries of that
class [i.e., the proletariat].” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 115). Stalin asserted that rule
of the proletariat was “unrestricted by law” and “based upon force” (Stalinism,
Leninism, 115). For Stalin, talk of “universal” equality, “pure” democracy,
“complete” democracy was “bourgeois verbiage” (Stalinism, Leninism, 1942, 115).
Regarding the purges, Stalin asserted that purging the party was necessary to
eliminate “the foulness of bureaucracy” and thereby sharpen it and improve its
effectiveness as the “guiding force” for “all the organizations of the
working class” (Stalin, Leninism, 1942, 90). This required constant vigilance.
Thus, anyone could be labeled an adversary of the proletariat, bureaucratic
slacker or a “Trotskyite” and be arrested and executed, which is what happened –
by the millions – all in the name of an ideology which demanded absolute political
conformity. By expressing a political opinion that differed from Stalin’s, a person
could be arrested and summarily executed, purely on ideological grounds.
Yet these facts alone cannot serve as the basis for drawing comparisons.
Political scientist Frederic Nicholson writes, “Stalinism was not a new
phenomenon but rather a reconfirmation of its Bolshevik-Marxist heritage”
(Nicholson, 1983, 45). Nicholson also describes Stalin as “brutal,” “a diabolical
power hungry intriguer,” and someone with a “lack of doctrine and pragmatic
orientation” (Nicholson, 1983, 45, 60, 61). Stalin was brutal. The record supports
that conclusion. Being power hungry implies being obsessed and therefore being
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out of control, which suggests the presence of a mental disorder. This is
speculative. That Stalin was an intriguer is established by the facts. He engaged
in secret behind-the-scene political maneuvering to gain and keep power.
Nevertheless, as to his principles and goals, from that he never wavered. Thus,
Nicholson’s comments provide some basis for forming an opinion as to Stalin’s
character, but for the most part are inconclusive.
While Stalin was considered cruel and repressive to some (Khrushchev,
1970, 566), in Germany Hitler was genuinely loved. Unlike Stalin, who was feared
by his own entourage and even by ordinary conscripts in the army (Service, 332,
337, 344), Hitler’s seizure of power threw the majority of Germans “into a
peculiarly hysterical state compounded of enthusiasm, incredulity and devotion”
(Fest, 1975, 374). The German people welcomed Hitler with joy. For the first time
since the days of the Kaiser, a majority of the German people could identify with
their government (Fest, 1975, 443). Hitler did not create a national revolution, he
led a national revolution. Hitler represented many German values (IMAH, video).
Hitler and the German people resonated with each other. Hitler described
this relationship as such: “I feel for you and you feel for me.” Germans
worshipped Hitler as the savior, the redeemer from unbearable poverty and
suffering (HiC, film – online). Former German Chancellor Franz von Papen talked
about the “genius of the chancellor [Hitler]” (Fest, 1975, 444). British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden found Hitler to be controlled and friendly (Fest, 1975,
443). Hitler was received as a hero and savior in Austria and the Sudetenland
(Fest, 1975, 549, 567). Throughout the war, volunteers from almost every nation in
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Europe and elsewhere served in Hitler’s armies (Estes, 2003, passim). The allied
armies in 1945 were not greeted by throngs of Germans giving thanks for their
liberation (as many Ukrainians greeted the invading German army) and in the
period immediately after the war the German people were forced to come to terms
with the consequences of their “collective guilt” (TFTTR, video). Even after the
July 20, 1944 assassination attempt, Hitler continued to command wide popular
devotion (Fest, 1975, 714).
In contrast to the genuine adoration of German people for Hitler were the
pleas of the Soviet nationals detained in the West, many of whom had been
prisoners of war and forced laborers, who desperately resisted repatriation to the
Soviet Union. Although some had collaborated with the Nazis and thus were
traitors, most feared return to the Soviet Union because they were members of
oppressed classes who had been targeted by the regime (Elliot, 1982, 257-258).
For many of them, return was tantamount to being sentenced to death (Wyman,
1998, 81). After the war, the number of Soviet nationals outside of the USSR was
about five and one-half-million persons (Elliot, 1982, 257). For Hitler, every
German was part of the Volk; for Stalin every Soviet citizen exposed to Western
influence was a potential enemy.
______________________________________________________________________
Conclusion
In conclusion, based on the evidence, one fact emerges: under both Hitler
and Stalin all legal safeguards meant to protect an individual from the arbitrary
application of power by government were ignored, circumvented or abolished,
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leaving every person vulnerable to the kinds of abuses associated with statesponsored terror. By this measure, the moral turpitude of the Hitler and Stalin
regimes, when measured against the principles contained in the Bill of Rights,
can be rated dead even. Whether their victims died in a Nazi concentration camp
somewhere in Poland or in a Soviet detention center in eastern Siberia, the cause
of death could be directly attributed to those in power who capriciously set policy,
issued orders, and demanded results. And it was the results that counted.
To label Hitler and Stalin as “mental cases” would be glib. Attempts have
been made to conduct retrospective psychological studies of to detect the
presence of psychopathology that could account for their behavior. These
studies are based on information derived without benefit of direct examination of
the subject. Dr. Norbert Bromberg found that Hitler had a narcissistic personality
with an underlying borderline personality structure (Bromberg, 1983, 22-23). Dr. G.
M. Gilbert, the prison psychologist for the defendants at the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg, called Hitler a paranoid psychopath (Gilbert, 1979, 283).
Clinical Research Coordinator Marina Stal concluded that Stalin had a paranoid
personality disorder (Stal, 2013, 4). Historian David Reynolds asserts that Stalin
had a mind that was “savage, vindictive, often paranoid” (SMS, video). As the
above mentioned claims are offered without any clinical examination of the
subjects, their conclusions must be treated as highly speculative. There is no
concrete evidence from any reliable clinical source proving that either Hitler or
Stalin was psychologically abnormal. Dr. Theodor Morell, Hitler’s personal
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physician, recorded that Hitler exhibited no phobias, obsessions, hallucinations,
illusions or paranoid trends and that Hitler was neurologically healthy (Morell,
1983, 35-37). According to historians Roy and Zhores Medvedev, Stalin suffered
from recurrent muscle pain in his hands and feet; in 1927 he was given a
thorough physical check-up which otherwise yielded normal results (Medvedev,
2004, 13).
That Hitler and Stalin operated according to a set of values that differed
from mainstream democratic values is a given; that both pursued political
programs that victimized millions of people is a given too; but to then conclude
that their actions is evidence of mental illness is clinically unsupportable and
violates notions of cultural relativism (which holds that there are no universal
standards to measure cultures (Donnelly, 1984, 400)), and can be construed as an
abuse of medical science in pursuit of a political agenda, in this case to discredit
Nazism and Communism. This is not to suggest that retrospective psychological
studies are not without value; rather, for the reasons already discussed, their
conclusions cannot be considered as definitive nor can they be used as the basis
for making comparisons. Ultimately, when comparing Hitler and Stalin, we must
rely on individual judgment.
In judging both men, we must take into consideration not only the times
and cultural influences that shaped them, but also those that shape all of us. We
all have been subjected to a lifetime of social conditioning that has shaped our
thoughts. Mass media, such as movies and television (immensely important in
the lives of most people) has played an enormous. This social conditioning
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renders us incapable of considering any question with absolute objectivity.
Because of biases which are ingrained in our minds, cognitive awareness of bias
does not dispel bias. For whatever reason, be it political or social, this memory of
Hitler and Stalin has been, and continues to be, shaped by the dozens of movies
dealing with them and their respective political systems. Due to all of this: when
comparing Hitler and Stalin and considering their place in history, the influence
of bias cannot be avoided. Therefore, the question of who was worse, Hitler or
Stalin, cannot be studied with full objectivity. The best we can do is to compile
evidence as fairly and as comprehensively as possible and reduce the influence
of bias to a minimum.
With that understanding, what does the evidence say about Hitler and
Stalin? First, each believed that he was justified in ordering the deaths of others
as a matter of political necessity. What would seem cruel to many was to them
not only reasonable but necessary. That was a function of the political culture in
which they operated. And when setting the rules, they were guided by principles
they had learned from others. Second, as leaders of totalitarian systems, they
believed that society was a collective and that the individual was subordinate to
the good of the group as determined by the leader. To oppose the leader was to
threaten the cohesion of the group, which in a society that rejected democratic
values and demanded conformity was itself considered immoral. Third, both
relied heavily on rationalizations to justify their actions, thereby obscuring the
inner workings of their minds and hiding what were perhaps their true
motivations. Fourth, they were products of their times. Men make their times but
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the times also make men. They were the products of history – free choice – yes –
but also shaped by powerful historical forces.
The Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 and the collectivization of agriculture in
the Ukraine, alluded to in this paper, was not examined in more detail because it
has been sometimes claimed that the horrendous loss of life was due at least in
part to faulty policy decisions, and not exclusively to repressive measures
targeting the local population (although the latter did play an important part).
Millions died as a result of Stalin’s agricultural policy; the exact total is unknown,
and estimates range from between 4 million to 10 million (Holodomor, online;
Wheatcroft, 1320, Rummel, 104). Some historians claim these deaths constituted
genocide (Ellman, 2007).
Also not examined in more detail was the Nazi program that targeted
children for murder. That differentiated Hitler from Stalin. Hitler wanted to
eliminate an entire “race.” This naturally meant killing children, too. Now, under
Stalin, the children of those accused of crimes were officially branded relatives of
enemies of the people. And that was a heavy burden indeed. Of course, many
children died during collectivization. Then, and those who enforced
collectivization knew this would happen, and was happening – and they did
nothing about it. But Stalin did not deliberately target children for extermination.
That was a policy unique to the Nazis, who rationalized their actions on racial
grounds. This doomed the Jews for destruction.
Jews in Nazi occupied Europe thought that if they were compliant with Nazi
directives, they could “ride out the storm”. Historian Michael Burleigh writes,
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"Many Jews no doubt felt that they had seen all this before" (Burleigh, 2000, 286).
This line of thinking seemed logical at the time. They were, after all, living in
Europe, where, it was believed, barbarism on the scope proposed by Hitler had
become a thing of the past. This added to the sense of disbelief that their lives
were actually in danger. Burleigh writes, "Given the difficulties people in liberal
democracies had in comprehending that one could single out and persecute a
group of people simply by virtue of membership of that group, it is unsurprising
that Jewish people could not grasp the enormity of what was happening"
(Burleigh, 2000, 286). Historian Jost Dulffler writes, "Only a few realized that there
was no longer any place for Jews in Germany" (Dulffler, 1996, 141). In fact, it soon
became apparent that there was no longer any place for Jews anywhere in
Europe, certainly not while Hitler was still in power.
At first the Jews were stunned. Shocked by the sheer ferocity of the Nazi
onslaught, there was virtually nothing they could do to defend themselves.
Isolated, vulnerable, and comprising only a small minority of the total population
in Europe (In Germany, Jews comprised less than one percent of the population),
for many Jews, their only defense was to deny what Hitler’s actions implied. To
admit the truth, that they were doomed, was a prospect too painful to
contemplate. Some fled, that is, if they were fortunate enough to know someone
willing to take them in. But for most, they were trapped. Where could they go?
Powerful nations had succumbed to Hitler’s fury. Other nations remained neutral
and did not want to get involved, and other nations, with regimes similarly
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ill-disposed toward Jews, were prepared to follow Hitler’s lead in his campaign to
make Europe Judenfrei.
Stalin too was hostile to the Jews, who he believed “posed a mortal danger
to his regime” (Payne, 1965, 666). However, his hostility was driven by politics,
not race, which was a fundamental difference between him and Hitler. While it is
true that some of Stalin’s actions had serious anti-Semitic overtones, such as the
so-called Doctors’ Plot and his consideration of a plan to purge all the Jews (and
other ethnic groups as well) from the Soviet Union and transport them to the
remote northern regions of Siberia where they could die of cold and starvation
(Payne, 1965, 666-667), there is no evidence that Stalin targeted Jews exclusively
based on race. That would have meant having to persecute the wives and
relatives of many of his closest cronies, several of whom were married to Jewish
women or were related to Jews (Payne, 1965, 666). Not that such familial
consideration alone would have had a moderating effect on Stalin. But it shows
that despite his personal disdain for Jews, he allowed his own inner circle to
associate with them.
One other point when comparing Hitler and Stalin: Although both dictators
left a legacy of death and destruction unprecedented in the annals of history, it
seems that Hitler is regarded with greater hatred. This is the case because
nobody wants a Third Reich to happen again. The idea of such a nihilistic regime
re-emerging is simply too outrageous and offensive for most people to accept.
The same, however, cannot be said for the Soviet Union. Despite the coarseness
and brutality of the Soviet system, founded on an ideology that today is
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discredited and rejected by most of the world, it still represents for some a noble
attempt to achieve a just society. Yet, that attempt was driven by a utopian vision
of the world that was not only a fantasy but was used as the pretext for
committing some of the vilest crimes in history. When the Bolsheviks executed
Czar Nicholas II on July 17, 1918, on Lenin’s order, that act could be rationalized
on political grounds (Pipes, 1994, 9n). But when they also slaughtered his wife
and five children, that was an act of mass murder motivated by hatred for their
helpless prisoners (Moorhead, 1984, 284). After the victims were shot and
bayoneted, their corpses were mutilated, burned and dumped into the bottom of a
mine shaft (Lincoln, 1989, 151-155). This wanton act of butchery established a
precedent for savagery that both Stalin and Hitler would build upon with lethal
results.
It is true that other despots (Mao Tse-tung, Pol Pot and Idi Amin, just to
name a few) have been implicated in acts of mass murder on a scale or at a rate
that approximated that of the Nazis and Bolsheviks, but it was Hitler and Stalin
who set the standard of depravity against which the brutality of other dictators
have been measured. What made the murderous schemes of Hitler and Stalin all
the more sinister and chilling is that both believed that what they were doing was
not only necessary and inevitable but served a positive good. For them,
obliterating entire peoples or classes was a perfectly valid way, indeed, the only
valid way, to ensure success of their programs, no matter how grotesque their
methods or plans. That Stalin was, for a while, an ally of the United States during
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the war does not negate the fact that for two years prior he was Hitler's willing
ally, and aided and abetted the latter in executing his aggressive designs. By
providing Hitler cover from the East, Stalin enabled Hitler to invade Poland and
then concentrate his forces against the West, with devastating results. It was only
after Hitler betrayed Stalin and unleashed his fury against the Soviet Union that
the Soviet leader belatedly came to his senses regarding the threat posed by his
former ally. But by then the damage was done, the Soviet Union was being
methodically battered, burned, and decimated by hordes of Nazis and their allies,
all of which forced Stalin to ally himself with the very same countries that he had
hoped Hitler would destroy. The critical role played by the Soviet Union in
defeating Hitler is legendary. But for the Soviet Union, victory came at a huge
price: twenty million people killed. Yet this carnage might have been avoided if
Stalin had adopted a realistic attitude toward Hitler (Conquest, 1990, 453).
The wanton deceitfulness shown by Hitler and Stalin toward each other add
further import to the question of who was worse, Hitler or Stalin. Both have
records that are so violent as to render any attempt at comparison academic.
Yet, what both of them did was far from academic – it was real and it happened.
That both amassed huge numbers of victims is a fact. The numbers speak for
themselves and require no further elaboration. But more germane is another fact:
that every victim of Nazi or Soviet persecution was an actual human being, who
was once alive, had goals, wishes, and desires, and was part of a family and a
community, and did not deserve to die. Nonetheless their lives were snuffed out
for reasons that are well-documented but entirely unsatisfactory. The deaths
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caused by Hitler or Stalin were not only tragic and criminal but an affront to
humanity. Whether one was shot by Bolsheviks because he was a kulak or
gassed by Nazis because he was a Jew, the result was the same. For the victims,
the statistics did not matter.
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